Summary
A Magistrate cannot take cognisance of a time-barred cheque-dishonour complaint and condone the delay afterwards. Under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the complainant must first satisfy the Court of sufficient cause, and the condonation must come before cognisance. Because cognisance here was taken on the day of filing and the two-day delay was condoned only five years later, the Court quashed the complaint.
Issues
- Whether a Magistrate may take cognisance of a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act filed after the one-month period and condone the delay later.
- Whether condoning the delay after cognisance cures the irregularity, as the High Court held.
Provisions considered
- Section 142(1)(b) and proviso, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881The complaint must be filed within one month of the cause of action under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. The proviso lets the Court take cognisance of a late complaint only if the complainant first satisfies it of sufficient cause. The Court held that the condonation must therefore precede cognisance. (¶¶ 7, 12, 13, 14)
- Section 138, proviso clause (c), Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881The cause of action for the complaint arises when the drawer fails to pay within fifteen days of receiving the notice. Relying on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod, the Court noted that the proviso only postpones institution of proceedings and cognisance until that point. (¶ 12)
- Order XLI Rules 3A and 5(3), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Cited as an example of the general position that a proceeding filed with limitation-linked delay does not become a regular matter on the Court's file until the delay is condoned. (¶ 14)
- Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The appellant's petition to quash the complaint was filed under this section. The High Court's refusal to quash was set aside. (¶¶ 2, 15)
Held
- Under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the Court's power to take cognisance of a belated complaint depends on the complainant first showing sufficient cause for the delay. The satisfaction that leads to condonation must come before cognisance is taken. (¶ 14)
- The High Court was wrong to treat condonation and cognisance as interchangeable steps that could be taken in either order, and wrong to treat a later condonation as curing a premature cognisance. That approach does not accord with the proviso. (¶¶ 8, 14)
- The respondent's failure to challenge the earlier orders of the Magistrate did not matter. The delay was condoned only on 30.10.2018, and the Magistrate's earlier orders had reserved the limitation issue for trial. (¶ 11)
- The Magistrate erred in taking cognisance of the complaint before condoning the two-day delay. The Court noted that the complainant had caused the problem by stating in the complaint that it was filed within time. (¶¶ 14, 15)
Result
Appeal allowed. The High Court's order of 28.06.2024 is set aside, and the complaint in PCR No. 3144 of 2013 (CC No. 1439 of 2014) before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mysore, is quashed.