Summary
The Court dismissed the default-bail appeal because the appellant’s earlier 34-day house arrest was not ordered purporting to exercise Section 167 powers. It nevertheless recognized that house arrest can constitute custody under that provision in appropriate cases. Actual detention under a purported Section 167 order may count despite illegality, and qualifying broken periods of custody may be aggregated; the appellant’s particular house-arrest orders did not meet that threshold.
Issues
- Whether the earlier house arrest counted toward the statutory period for default bail.
- Whether superior courts and transit-remand orders may authorize custody under Section 167.
- Whether illegality or interrupted custody prevents counting detention for default bail.
- Whether house arrest is legally available as a form of remand.
Provisions considered
- Section 167, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Distinguished qualifying investigative detention from custody not purportedly ordered under the provision, while recognizing transit remand, superior-court orders and appropriate house arrest within its scope. (¶¶ 24, 65, 66, 67, 68, 78, 90, 91, 92, 93, 98, 135, 136, 138, 139, 141)
- Section 43-D(2), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967Explained the modified remand periods and the affidavit-based exception for obtaining police custody from judicial custody beyond the initial period. (¶¶ 126, 127, 128, 131)
- Articles 21 and 22(1)–(2), Constitution of IndiaExamined the deprivation of liberty inherent in house arrest and constitutional safeguards against unlawful arrest and detention, without treating every deprivation as Section 167 custody. (¶¶ 18, 51, 53, 100, 101, 102, 103, 135, 136)
Held
- House arrest restricting movement and contact is custody and deprivation of liberty. Courts may employ it under Section 167 in appropriate cases, considering matters such as age, health, antecedents, the offence, investigative needs and enforceability; no automatic entitlement was created. (¶¶ 45, 51, 98, 137, 138, 139)
- Transit remand is an order under Section 167 authorizing continued detention, not merely a production direction. Superior courts may also exercise the relevant remand powers through appropriate jurisdiction. (¶¶ 65, 66, 67, 68, 76, 77, 78)
- Qualifying broken periods of custody may be combined. Actual detention under an order purporting to invoke Section 167 counts even if the order is illegal; the High Court’s contrary requirement of invariably valid authorization was rejected. Custody under an order not purporting to act under Section 167 stands differently. (¶¶ 67, 90, 91, 92, 93)
- Habeas corpus ordinarily does not lie against competent judicial remand, but remains available for absolute illegality, lack of jurisdiction or an absolutely mechanical order. (¶¶ 61, 62, 63, 104)
- Under the UAPA modification, police custody ordinarily falls within the initial thirty days. The specified proviso allows custody from judicial custody beyond that period on an affidavit explaining reasons and delay; it does not create an unrestricted power to seek police custody at any time. (¶¶ 126, 127, 128, 131)
- On the particular orders and surrounding circumstances, neither court purported to order the disputed house arrest under Section 167. Its reality as deprivation of liberty did not dispense with the statutory condition for default bail; this decision did not adjudicate the house-arrest orders’ legality on appeal. (¶¶ 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 141)
- The Court also observed that suitable judicial-custody cases during inquiry or trial could employ house arrest; post-conviction use was left for legislative consideration. (¶¶ 139, 140)
Result
Appeal dismissed without costs; the 34-day house-arrest period was not counted toward default bail on these facts.