Summary
The Supreme Court upheld the rejection, as time-barred, of a faculty member's sexual harassment complaint against the Vice-Chancellor of NUJS. The last incident of sexual harassment was in April 2023; the later administrative actions (removal as Centre Director, a preliminary inquiry) were collective, independent decisions with no direct link to the earlier harassment, so the complaint of 26.12.2023 was beyond the maximum six-month period under Section 9 of the POSH Act.
Issues
- Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in holding the appellant's complaint to the Local Complaints Committee barred by limitation.
- Whether the administrative actions taken against the appellant after April 2023 amounted to sexual harassment under Section 3(2) of the POSH Act so as to extend the date of the last incident.
- Whether a complaint patently barred by limitation can be rejected at the threshold.
Provisions considered
- Section 2(n), Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013Read together with Section 3 to identify what acts or behaviour amount to sexual harassment. (¶¶ 10, 12)
- Section 3(2), Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013The words 'in relation to or connected with' require a direct link between the action complained of and an overt act of sexual harassment; the August 2023 administrative actions had no such link and did not amount to sexual harassment. (¶¶ 11, 12, 22, 26, 27)
- Section 9(1) and second proviso, Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013A complaint must be made within three months of the incident or the last of a series of incidents, extendable by a further three months for recorded reasons; six months from the last incident is the outer limit, which the complaint exceeded. (¶¶ 13, 14, 22, 32)
- Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Applied by analogy: a complaint which on a plain reading of its averments is patently barred by limitation may be rejected at the first instance without calling the other side. (¶ 15)
Held
- On a combined reading of Sections 2(n) and 3 of the POSH Act, sexual harassment covers not only the unwelcome acts listed in Section 2(n) but also circumstances connected with such acts, such as promise of preferential treatment, threat of detrimental treatment, interference with work or creating a hostile work environment. (¶ 12)
- Under Section 9 a complaint must be filed within three months of the last incident, or within a further extended period of three months, that is, at most six months from the last incident of sexual harassment. (¶¶ 13, 14)
- Limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of fact and law, but a complaint that is patently barred on a plain reading of its averments can be rejected at the threshold on the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. (¶ 15)
- The appellant's removal as Director of the Centre in August 2023 arose from an independent complaint by an outside body, and the inquiry into project funds was a collective decision of the Executive Council; these administrative actions did not create a gender-based hostile environment and were not acts of sexual harassment. (¶¶ 23, 24, 25, 26)
- The phrase 'in relation to or connected with' in Section 3(2) requires a direct link between the action complained of and an overt act of sexual harassment; no such link existed between the April 2023 incident and the later events. (¶ 27)
- Distinguishing a continuing wrong from a recurring wrong, the April 2023 incident was complete in itself and did not continue; it remained the last incident, and the appellant's own application for condonation of delay showed she treated it so. (¶¶ 28, 29, 31)
- The Division Bench committed no error in restoring the Local Complaints Committee's decision that the complaint was time-barred. (¶ 32)
Result
Appeal dismissed. The Court directed that the judgment be made part of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance to be ensured by him personally.