Summary
The Supreme Court quashed an FIR for rape on a false promise of marriage, cheating, insult and intimidation. The complainant, a mature woman who knew the appellant was married, kept up a physical relationship with him from 2008 to 2017 without protest. Consent was therefore not shown to have been vitiated by a misconception of fact, and the FIR disclosed no ingredients of the other offences.
Issues
- Whether the FIR alleging repeated sexual intercourse from 2008 to 2017 on a false promise of marriage disclosed a prima facie offence of rape under Section 376 IPC, having regard to Sections 375 and 90 IPC.
- Whether the FIR disclosed offences under Sections 420, 504 and 506 IPC.
- Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that rape is an offence against society.
Provisions considered
- Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Applying Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure, the Court held that the High Court may quash an FIR where, on a prima facie view of the material and without minute scrutiny, no cognizable offence is made out or the proceeding is an abuse of process; continuing this prosecution would be such an abuse. (¶¶ 13, 14, 15, 35)
- Sections 375 and 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860Rape under clause Secondly requires the act to be without consent; on the FIR's own allegations of a long relationship without protest, no prima facie case of rape was made out. (¶¶ 16, 19, 24, 34)
- Section 90, Indian Penal Code, 1860Consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent, but a promise of marriage creates such a misconception only if it was false from the outset, made with intent to deceive, and directly induced the sexual relationship. (¶¶ 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 29)
- Sections 420, 504 and 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860On reading the FIR, the Court found no allegations bringing the case within cheating, intentional insult to provoke breach of the peace or criminal intimidation. (¶ 34)
Held
- Under Section 482 CrPC the court does not minutely examine the correctness of the allegations; taking a prima facie view of the material, it may quash an FIR that discloses no cognizable offence or is a mala fide proceeding instituted to wreak vengeance. (¶¶ 14, 15)
- Consent under Section 375 involves an active, reasoned understanding of the act and its consequences. A false promise of marriage vitiates consent through a misconception of fact under Section 90 only where it was made in bad faith from the very beginning with no intention of keeping it, and had a direct nexus with the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. A promise made in good faith but later not kept is a breach, not a false promise. (¶¶ 20, 21, 23, 24)
- To attach criminal liability, the physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise and not to other considerations, such as personal liking; where a woman knowingly maintains a relationship over a prolonged period, it cannot be said with certainty that she did so only because of the promise. (¶ 22)
- The longer a physical relationship continues without protest or insistence on marriage by the woman, the more it points to a consensual relationship rather than one based on a false promise. Even if a false promise was initially made, prolonged continuation without demur makes the plea of continuing misconception implausible and takes out the sting of criminal culpability. (¶¶ 25, 27, 28)
- On the facts, the complainant was a mature woman with grown-up children who knew the appellant was married, kept up the relationship from 2008 to 2017 without protest, and complained only after his financial support stopped. The relationship was in the nature of a consensual extra-marital affair and there was no vitiation of consent. (¶¶ 26, 27, 29, 30)
- The Court noted a worrying trend of long consensual relationships being criminalised after they turn sour, and warned against attributing criminal intent to a disturbed civil relationship; it clarified that its observations are confined to the facts, as cases on human relationships turn on their own circumstances. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33)
- No prima facie case of rape under Section 376 IPC was made out, the FIR contained no allegations attracting Sections 420, 504 or 506 IPC, and continuing the prosecution would be an abuse of the process of court. (¶¶ 34, 35)
Result
Appeal allowed; High Court order set aside and FIR under Sections 376, 420, 504 and 506 IPC quashed, without barring the complainant from pursuing any other remedy available in law.