Summary
Delhi's Deputy Chief Minister brought a private defamation complaint before a Magistrate against political rivals. One had alleged at a press conference that he was behind a Rs 2,000 crore classroom-construction scam; another tweeted that his answers would expose his scam. Both challenged the summons. The Supreme Court held that a Minister or other public servant covered by Section 199(2) CrPC may either have the Public Prosecutor complain to the Sessions Court with sanction under Section 199(4) or complain personally to a Magistrate under Section 199(6). The two routes are parallel, and Section 250 guards against complaints without reasonable cause. The press-conference speaker's appeal failed. The tweeter's summons was quashed, because saying that answers to his questions would 'disclose your scam' is too vague to be defamatory without more.
Issues
- Whether a public servant or Minister covered by Section 199(2) CrPC must prosecute defamation relating to public functions only through the Public Prosecutor with sanction under Section 199(4), or may file a private complaint under Section 199(6).
- Whether a tweet stating that the complainant's answers to posed questions would disclose his scam is per se defamatory under Section 499 IPC.
Provisions considered
- Section 199(2), (4) and (6), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Sub-section (6) preserves, without conditions, the individual's right to complain to a Magistrate; it is not eclipsed by the non obstante clause in sub-section (2), and the two procedures are alternative. (¶¶ 38, 45, 46, 50, 51)
- Sections 237 and 250, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Loss of the compensation safeguard in Section 237 is no reason to confine public servants to Section 199(2), since Section 250 provides compensation for accusations without reasonable cause before a Magistrate. (¶¶ 52, 53, 54, 55)
- Sections 499 and 500, Indian Penal Code, 1860An imputation must be specific and capable of harming reputation; a vague claim that answers would expose a scam is not defamatory without more. (¶¶ 58, 59, 60, 62, 63)
Held
- The legislative history from Section 198B of the 1898 Code through the 41st Law Commission Report to Section 199(6) shows that the special procedure was always in addition to, not in derogation of, the public servant's individual right to complain; such a person may take either the route in Section 199(4) or that in Section 199(6). (¶¶ 35, 36, 39, 51)
- Subramanian Swamy does not confine Section 199(6) to cases where sanction is refused, and K.K. Mishra recognises that the individual right is saved; reading conditions into sub-section (6) would violate its plain language. (¶¶ 45, 47, 48, 49, 50)
- If the allegations, even taken as true, do not make out the offence, the accused should not face trial; statements by a political rival such as 'I will expose your scam' are not per se defamatory, and the Magistrate had not applied his mind to the tweets. (¶¶ 58, 60, 61, 62, 63)
Result
Appeal of the press-conference speaker dismissed; appeal of the tweeter allowed and the summoning order quashed as against him, the complaint to proceed against the other accused; the Section 65B objection not decided.