Summary
The Court revived housing allottees’ consumer complaints that had been adjourned pending litigation over their association’s registration and byelaws. The named allottees had filed individual affidavits and could pursue joint complaints for their own grievances without invoking representative-action procedure. The association dispute therefore did not justify holding up the complaints; the National Commission was directed to hear them expeditiously on merits.
Issues
- Whether the association’s registration and byelaw proceedings justified adjourning the allottees’ consumer complaints.
- Whether multiple consumers pursuing their own grievances jointly had to comply with representative-action procedure.
- How the joint character of the complaints affected the objection to pecuniary jurisdiction.
Provisions considered
- Sections 2(1)(b)(i), 12(1)(a)–(c) and 13(6), Consumer Protection Act, 1986“A consumer” includes multiple consumers joining to seek their own relief. Section 12(1)(c) and its representative procedure are distinct from such joint complaints. The members who filed affidavits could proceed under section 12(1)(a) without deciding the association’s entitlement under section 12(1)(b). (¶¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 23)
- Order I Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Representative-action procedure applies through section 13(6) to complaints brought for numerous interested consumers under section 12(1)(c); it was unnecessary for these named consumers jointly seeking relief for themselves. (¶¶ 16, 17, 18, 19)
- Section 21(a)(i), Consumer Protection Act, 1986In addressing the jurisdiction objection, the Court relied on the exposition that aggregate value and compensation determine jurisdiction under the 1986 regime. The joint complaint was not to be fragmented into separate individual claims requiring a different forum. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 23)
Held
- Consumer-protection legislation calls for a constructive approach that advances its protective purpose while respecting its language. A technical view that prevents consumers from pursuing their remedies despite the statutory routes available to them defeats that objective. (¶¶ 15, 16, 23)
- A joint complaint by named consumers seeking redress for their own grievances differs from one brought on behalf of all numerous consumers sharing an interest. The former falls within the consumer route under section 12(1)(a); Order I Rule 8 is attracted through sections 12(1)(c) and 13(6) for the latter. Merely having more than one complainant does not require a representative complaint. (¶¶ 16, 17, 18, 19)
- The individual allottees had filed affidavits, bringing their complaints within section 12(1)(a). Consequently, it was unnecessary to decide whether the association qualified under section 12(1)(b). The pending registration and byelaw dispute supplied no reason to postpone adjudication of these complaints. This conclusion did not decide that separate registration litigation. (¶¶ 1, 9, 10, 11, 19, 23)
- The Court relied on the exposition permitting aggregate valuation of joint complaints when considering pecuniary jurisdiction. Its discussion distinguished the 1986 measure of goods or services plus compensation from the consideration-paid measure discussed in the cited 2019 Act proceedings; the newer monetary threshold was not substituted for the regime governing these 2017 complaints. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 23)
- After more than five years without progress on merits, further adjournment was unwarranted. The impugned orders were set aside, the appeals allowed and the National Commission directed to hear the matters expeditiously on merits, without an order as to costs. No compensation or other substantive housing relief was determined in these appeals. (¶¶ 23, 24)
Result
Appeals allowed; adjournment orders set aside. National Commission to hear the consumer complaints expeditiously on merits. No order as to costs.