Summary
Oustees whose land was acquired by HUDA in 1992 sued some 14 to 20 years later for mandatory injunctions under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to compel allotment of plots at the price fixed by the 1992 oustee policy, without having applied in the prescribed format with earnest money. The Supreme Court held that Brij Mohan does not lay down that oustees are always entitled to the rate at which the sector was first floated, that the suits were hopelessly time-barred, and that an oustee must perform his own obligation under the scheme before invoking Section 39; but, in view of HUDA's undertaking, it permitted the respondents to apply under the 2016 policy within four weeks.
Issues
- Whether the respondent oustees are entitled to allotment of plots at the rate prescribed by the 1992 oustee policy or at the rate under the revised policy of 2016 (as modified in 2018).
- Whether the decision in Brij Mohan v. HUDA lays down as its ratio that the 'normal allotment rate' is always the rate at which the sector was first floated for sale, and how the ratio decidendi of a judgment is to be identified.
- Whether suits for mandatory injunction under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to enforce the oustee scheme were maintainable where the plaintiffs had not applied in the prescribed format with deposit of 10 per cent earnest money, and were instituted 14 to 20 years after the acquisition.
- Whether displaced landowners have a constitutional or statutory right to rehabilitation beyond compensation.
Provisions considered
- Sections 39 and 2(a), Specific Relief Act, 1963A mandatory injunction is discretionary and lies only to prevent breach of an 'obligation' (every duty enforceable by law, whether arising from contract, tort, trust or statute) by compelling acts the court can enforce; the plaintiff must plead and prove a clear obligation, its breach or apprehended breach, necessity, enforceability, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Where the scheme requires the oustee to apply in a specified format with earnest money, doing so is part of the oustee's own obligation before he can call upon the authority to allot; the courts below never examined this. (¶¶ 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 86, 91)
- Articles 58 and 113 and Section 3, Limitation Act, 1963Whichever Article applies, the period is three years from accrual of the right to sue; suits instituted 14 to 20 years after the 1992 acquisition and advertisement, with no explanation and no recurring cause of action, were hopelessly time-barred and could have been dismissed on that ground alone. (¶¶ 27, 85, 90, 92, 93)
- Regulation 5, Haryana Urban Development (Disposal of Land and Buildings) Regulations, 1978An intending purchaser must apply to the Estate Officer in the prescribed form and no application is valid unless accompanied by not less than ten per cent of the price as a demand draft; the State's specific case that the oustees never so applied was not dealt with by the trial court, first appellate court or High Court. (¶¶ 16, 17, 18, 27, 85)
- Section 50, Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977Relied on by the appellant as barring civil court jurisdiction over matters cognizable by the authority; noted among the provisions cited, but the Court did not rest its decision on it. (¶¶ 25, 27)
- Sections 4, 6, 23(1A), 23(2) and 28, Land Acquisition Act, 1894The Act contemplates only solatium, additional amount and higher interest for land-losers, not allotment of plots at cost price; the oustee scheme is a benefit in addition to those statutory benefits and allotment must be strictly on the scheme's terms (Brij Mohan). (¶¶ 43, 44, 64)
- Articles 21 and 300-A, Constitution of IndiaAcquisition in accordance with law does not violate any fundamental right of displaced persons; the plea of deprivation of livelihood under Article 21 is unsustainable, rehabilitation is not a recognised right under the Constitution or the Land Acquisition Act, and beneficial measures are guided by humanitarian considerations and the policy framed. (¶¶ 78, 83, 84, 95)
Held
- Only the ratio decidendi, the proposition of law necessary to decide the issue, binds; a case is an authority for what it actually decides, not for what logically follows. The ratio may be isolated by Wambaugh's inversion test (reverse the proposition and ask whether the decision would be the same; a proposition that fails it is at best a dictum, so the test is most reliable for showing what is not ratio), Halsbury's test (the enunciated principle on which the question was really determined, read with the particular facts) and Goodhart's test (the material facts as found by the judge plus the decision on them). (¶¶ 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62)
- Applying those tests, Brij Mohan does not cover the present case. Its first answer, that the Land Acquisition Act gives only solatium, additional amount and interest and that a court cannot direct allotment at cost price where the scheme specifies a rate, stands; its second answer, charging the rate at which plots were first offered, turned on the fact that the oustee had applied in 1990 and the authority delayed allotment. It lays down no absolute rule that the 'normal allotment rate' is always the rate when the sector was first floated; the normal allotment rate is the rate advertised by HUDA in pursuance of which the plots are allotted. (¶¶ 43, 44, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 95)
- Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act requires a clear, legally enforceable obligation, its breach, necessity, enforceability, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, and relief amenable to judicial discretion. Where the scheme requires an oustee to apply in the specified format with earnest money, that is the oustee's own obligation which must be performed before HUDA can be compelled to perform its part; the first appellate court and the High Court failed to deal with the State's specific case that no such applications were made. (¶¶ 74, 75, 76, 86, 89, 90, 91)
- Suits instituted 14 to 20 years after the acquisition and the 1992 advertisement were hopelessly time-barred under the three-year period applicable under Article 58 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act; the case is not one of recurring cause of action, and the suits could have been dismissed on limitation alone. (¶¶ 90, 92, 93)
- Acquisition of land does not violate any constitutional or fundamental right of displaced persons; the plea of deprivation of livelihood under Article 21 is unsustainable, rehabilitation is not a recognised right under the Constitution or the Land Acquisition Act, and displaced persons are entitled to resettlement only as per the policy framed for the project. Rehabilitation schemes over and above monetary compensation should be the rarest exception, meant for those rendered destitute by loss of residence or livelihood, and unnecessary schemes floated to appease the public breed litigation. (¶¶ 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 95)
- Notwithstanding these findings, in view of HUDA's statement before the Court that it would abide by the policy of 11.08.2016 and accommodate every eligible oustee, the respondents were not non-suited entirely but permitted to seek the benefit of the 2016 policy. (¶¶ 20, 21, 28, 68, 69, 94)
Result
Appeals disposed of with directions: respondents are not entitled as of right to plots at the 1992 policy price; they may within four weeks (no extension) apply online, or physically if unable to apply online, with the requisite deposit under the 2016 policy, and HUDA shall process such applications and decide eligibility within eight weeks of receipt; allotments to carry a condition barring transfer without the competent authority's permission and in any case within five years; State and HUDA to guard against cartels of land grabbers; Registry to circulate the judgment to all High Courts.