Summary
The Supreme Court acquitted an appellant convicted of attempted murder through common intention. He had neither carried nor fired the pistol, and the evidence did not reliably establish his alleged exhortation or a shared intention to kill. Material omissions and inconsistent accounts, the shooter’s chance intervention and prior family disputes created doubt. The Court reiterated that common intention may arise at the scene, but must be proved rather than inferred from mere presence or participation.
Issues
- Whether the prosecution proved a shared intention to kill and the appellant’s alleged instigation sufficient for Section 307 read with Section 34 liability.
Held
- Section 34 provides joint liability rather than a separate substantive offence. A shared intention may develop during the occurrence and no individual overt act is indispensable, but mere participation or independently similar intentions do not establish the required consensus. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27)
- The shooter appeared to have intervened by chance, with no evidence of an agreed convergence or plan. The injured witness’s police statement omitted the alleged instigation, and the eyewitness accounts differed materially about its content and timing. Common intention was not established either beforehand or at the scene. (¶¶ 16, 17, 18, 28, 29)
- Evidence of a hostile witness is not rejected wholesale. Here its corroborated account supported the quarrel and shooter’s intervention but did not establish an exhortation by the appellant; medical and formal evidence likewise did not prove his alleged role. (¶¶ 8, 9, 11, 19, 28)
Result
Appeal allowed; appellant’s conviction and sentence set aside. He was acquitted and directed to be set free forthwith. Merits of principal accused Khilai’s conviction expressly not considered; any appeal by him to be decided independently.