Summary
A plaintiff who is neither the executant of a sale deed nor a person claiming through the executant is not obliged to sue for its cancellation under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; it is enough to seek a declaration of title, and the proviso to Section 34 does not bar such a suit for want of a prayer for cancellation or a declaration that the deed is not binding. The High Court, having concurred with both courts below that the plaintiff's registered gift deed of 1958 was valid, erred in dismissing his suit merely because he had not sought cancellation of a 1997 sale deed executed by persons with no title; the trial court's decree was restored.
Issues
- Whether the High Court was right that a suit for declaration of title based on a valid gift deed must fail because the plaintiff omitted to seek the consequential relief of cancellation of a subsequent sale deed, or a declaration that it was not binding on him.
Provisions considered
- Section 31, Specific Relief Act, 1963Cancellation is a protective, preventive remedy available to 'any person' against whom an instrument is void or voidable; following Muppudathi Pillai and Deccan Paper Mills, that expression covers only a party to the instrument or a person bound by or claiming through a party, not a stranger whose title is asserted adversely. The plaintiff, not being the executant of the 1997 sale deed, was not obliged to seek its cancellation. (¶¶ 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 34)
- Section 34 and proviso, Specific Relief Act, 1963A person entitled to a legal character or a right to property may sue for a declaration; the proviso bars a bare declaration only where the plaintiff, able to seek further relief, omits to do so. 'Further relief' must flow directly and necessarily from the declaration, and the proviso does not compel a plaintiff to sue for every relief conceivably available. Section 34 is not exhaustive of declaratory relief. (¶¶ 25, 26, 27, 28, 38)
Held
- The jurisdiction under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is protective or preventive, akin to a quia timet action, to remove a document that may otherwise be a source of potential mischief. Three conditions must exist: the instrument is void or voidable against the plaintiff, the plaintiff reasonably apprehends serious injury from its remaining outstanding, and the court considers it proper to grant the relief. Relief is granted only in respect of an instrument likely to affect the plaintiff's title, executed by the plaintiff or by a person who can bind him, and not an instrument executed by a stranger to that title. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22)
- The observation in Sk. Golam Lalchand v. Nandu Lal Shaw that Section 31 uses 'may' means only that cancellation is not mandatory even for parties to an instrument or persons claiming through them, so a stranger cannot be required to seek it; it cannot be read to mean that a stranger to an instrument executed by another person falls within 'any person' in Section 31. (¶¶ 23, 24)
- Under Section 34, 'legal character' and 'right as to any property' are disjunctive, and either may found a suit. The object of the proviso is to avoid multiplicity of suits, but whether further relief had to be claimed depends on the facts: the further relief must flow directly or necessarily from the declaration, be capable of grant and enforcement, and be necessary to make the declaration fruitful. The proviso forbids only a bare declaration where necessary further relief is omitted; it does not compel the plaintiff to sue for every relief that could possibly be granted. (¶¶ 26, 27, 28)
- Where the executant of a deed wants it annulled he must seek cancellation under Section 31, but a non-executant need only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, non est or not binding on him. A person not party to a document or decree is not obliged to sue for its cancellation since it neither affects his title nor binds him; indeed it is logically impossible for a non-party to seek cancellation, his remedy being a declaration that the deed is invalid so far as he is concerned (Unni v. Kunchi Amma; Bijoy Gopal Mukerji; Vellayya Konar; Suhrid Singh). (¶¶ 29, 30, 31, 32, 33)
- A suit for cancellation of a sale deed and a suit for a declaration that a document is inoperative against the plaintiff are distinct. The plaintiff, not being the executant of the sale deed dated 05.05.1997, was not obliged to sue for its cancellation. In a suit for declaration of title the court in any event considers the defendants' pleas about the validity and binding nature of any document said to defeat the plaintiff's title, irrespective of the frame of the suit. (¶¶ 34, 35)
- Having concurred with the courts below on the validity of the gift deed, the High Court should not have dismissed the suit merely because the plaintiff did not pray for cancellation of the sale deed: a declaration of title is as good as cancellation, or at least a declaration that the sale deed is void, non est and not binding on the plaintiff. The plaint must be read as a whole and relief justified by the averments and evidence may be granted though not specifically claimed; the plaintiff's averment that the vendors had no title or saleable right reflected his intention not to be bound by any instrument they executed. (¶¶ 36, 37)
- Courts have ample inherent power, and a duty, to shape declarations to afford the relief the justice of the case requires. Section 34 gives statutory recognition to one type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it is not exhaustive and does not circumscribe the jurisdiction to grant declarations in appropriate cases outside it (Supreme General Films Exchange). (¶ 38)
- Mohd. Noorul Hoda and Abdul Rahim, relied on by the defendants, concerned limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act and persons bound by an instrument or decree though not parties (a purchaser through his benamidar); they do not apply where, as here, the plaintiff does not claim through or under the vendors of the impugned sale deed and the concurrent finding that his gift deed was valid was not challenged. (¶¶ 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45)
Result
Appeal allowed; the High Court's common judgment dated 09.10.2015 in RSA Nos. 3 and 11 of 2007 set aside; the trial court's decree as affirmed by the first appellate court restored; no order as to costs; pending applications disposed of.