Summary
The Constitution Bench held that introducing a minimum viva-voce cutoff after the interviews in Kerala’s district-judge recruitment contradicted the governing rules and frustrated substantive legitimate expectations, violating Article 14. However, it declined to induct the petitioners or displace qualified judges who had served for six years. The broader question about changing selection criteria midstream was not decided.
Issues
- Whether the post-interview cutoff contradicted the governing recruitment rules and Article 14.
- What must be established for substantive legitimate expectation and justification of its frustration.
- Whether successful candidates should be displaced or petitioners inducted after six years.
Provisions considered
- Rule 2(c)(iii), as governing the 2015 selection, Kerala State Higher Judicial Services Special Rules, 1961The rule required selection by aggregate written and viva-voce marks; read with the notified scheme expressly excluding a viva cutoff, it barred the later administrative alteration. (¶¶ 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 46, 47, 50, 51, 55)
- Article 14, Constitution of IndiaThe unexplained departure from the lawful announced scheme failed fairness, consistency and predictability requirements and frustrated legitimate expectations in an arbitrary manner. (¶¶ 24, 35, 38, 42, 43, 44, 49, 51, 52, 55)
Held
- An administrative order may supplement statutory rules when they are silent, consistently with their purpose, but cannot contradict express rules and the examination scheme. The later rule amendment did not govern this recruitment, which began under an aggregate-marks scheme expressly providing no viva cutoff. (¶¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 50, 51)
- Substantive legitimate expectation can protect an expected benefit based on an existing lawful promise or established practice, but is not a free-standing legal right or independent ground of judicial review. The claimant must establish both a legitimate expectation and denial violating Article 14. (¶¶ 26, 31, 36, 43, 44, 55)
- Once a legitimate expectation is established, the public authority must objectively justify its frustration through relevant material demonstrating overriding public interest. The doctrine does not freeze all policy choices; courts weigh the claimed expectation against a sufficiently compelling public interest. (¶¶ 32, 36, 37, 38, 55)
- The rules, notified scheme and recruitment notice lawfully generated an expectation of aggregate ranking without a viva cutoff. Imposing one after interviews, despite the previous practice, was unfair and inconsistent. The aim of selecting suitable judges could not justify action contrary to the applicable legal framework. (¶¶ 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52)
- Although the decision was unlawful, qualified selected judges had served for about six years. Public interest and the loss of their acquired experience militated against unseating them, and the Court declined induction of the petitioners. Their nonselection was expressly not a reflection on merit or ability for future consideration. (¶¶ 53, 54, 55)
- The broader constitutional reference about changing selection rules midstream did not require resolution on these facts. The petitions were disposed of on the narrower grounds and relief stated. (¶¶ 9, 15, 56, 57)
Result
Petitions disposed of: post-interview cutoff held contrary to the applicable rule and Article 14, but no induction or displacement ordered after six years. Petitioners’ future consideration not prejudiced by this nonselection; pending applications disposed of.