Summary
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acquittal of a husband charged with murdering his wife by setting her on fire and restored his conviction under Section 302 IPC. The wife's dying declaration was recorded by the Tehsildar after medical certification of fitness and was voluntary, truthful and reliable. The High Court had rejected it on minor discrepancies about the time of recording and on whether the Tehsildar wrote it himself, which were hyper-technical grounds, and had relied on hostile and defence witnesses who did not deserve credit.
Issues
- When may the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order of acquittal that reversed a conviction?
- Whether the dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate was reliable enough to sustain a conviction without corroboration.
- Whether the deceased's failure to name the assailant in the earliest version (the rukka/FIR), the testimony of hostile and defence witnesses, and the accused's attempt to put out the fire made the plea of self-immolation probable.
- Whether the absence of proved motive was fatal to the prosecution.
Provisions considered
- Section 32(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872A statement by a deceased person about the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death is admissible. Applying Khushal Rao, Paniben, Laxman and Veerpal, the Court held that a dying declaration found voluntary, truthful and reliable can alone support a conviction, and that corroboration is a rule of prudence, not of law. (¶¶ 15.1, 16, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 17, 24)
- Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860On the dying declaration, the Court held it proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent committed murder, and it restored the trial court's conviction and life sentence. (¶¶ 12, 24, 27)
- Article 136, Constitution of IndiaRelying on Rajesh Prasad, Phoolchand Rathore and Ajmal Beg, the Court held that an acquittal may be reversed where it is perverse, based on a misreading of evidence or a wrong application of law, or where it results in a grave miscarriage of justice, while exercising the power with circumspection. (¶¶ 13, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 26)
Held
- There is no absolute bar on an appellate court reappreciating the evidence behind an acquittal. Where the acquittal is manifestly erroneous, perverse, founded on a misreading of evidence or on a wrong application of law, the Supreme Court may set it aside and convict, exercising the power with circumspection and in exceptional cases. (¶¶ 13, 13.4)
- A dying declaration need not be made in expectation of death. A conviction under Section 302 IPC can rest on it alone if it is voluntary, truthful and reliable. One recorded by a competent Magistrate stands on a higher footing, and medical certification of fitness is not an absolute requirement. (¶¶ 16, 16.1, 16.3, 16.4)
- The dying declaration inspired confidence. It was recorded by the Tehsildar, a neutral officer, after medical opinion on fitness. It was corroborated by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the deceased's brother, it bore her thumb impression, it clearly attributed the pouring of kerosene and the lighting of the fire to the respondent, and there was nothing to suggest tutoring. The medical officer's vacillation was not enough to discard it. (¶¶ 17, 24)
- The High Court's two grounds for rejecting the declaration were unsustainable. The brother's initial vague reference to the evening was clarified as about 11.30 a.m. and was a minor, explained discrepancy. Recording a declaration under the Magistrate's supervision does not invalidate it, and the defence had not suggested to the Tehsildar in cross-examination that he did not record it. The law prescribes no rigid form for a dying declaration, and hyper-technical objections cannot defeat a reliable one. (¶¶ 18, 18.1, 18.2, 18.3)
- An FIR is not an encyclopaedia of the prosecution case. That the deceased did not name the assailant in the earliest version, given while the family was concerned with saving her life after about 70% burns, did not discredit the later dying declaration recorded in accordance with law. (¶ 19)
- The hostile witnesses' account that the deceased spoke of self-immolation was hearsay, uncorroborated and not disclosed at the earliest opportunity. A hostile witness can be relied on only to the extent corroborated (Bhajju). The defence witnesses had no direct knowledge of the act. The respondent's attempt to put out the fire and his minor burns did not exonerate him, and the plea of self-immolation was rejected. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22)
- Motive matters mainly in cases resting on circumstantial evidence. Where there is a credible dying declaration, the absence of strong proof of motive is not fatal. In any event, the record showed matrimonial discord and abuse that furnished a plausible background. (¶ 23)
Result
Appeal by the State allowed; the High Court's acquittal set aside and the trial court's conviction under Section 302 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment with fine restored; the respondent is to surrender forthwith, failing which the trial court is to take steps in accordance with law.