Summary
The High Court cannot, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, itself reject a plaint. Rejection of a plaint is governed by Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the trial court and is a deemed decree appealable under Section 96; by entertaining a prayer for rejection under Article 227 the High Court usurped the trial court's original jurisdiction and deprived the plaintiffs of their right of appeal. The order rejecting the plaint as barred by the Benami Act was set aside without any opinion on the merits.
Issues
- Whether the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, can reject a plaint.
- Whether the statutory scheme of Order VII Rule 11 and Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can be bypassed by invoking Article 227 to seek rejection of a plaint.
Provisions considered
- Article 227, Constitution of IndiaThe power is supervisory, meant to keep courts and tribunals within the limits of their jurisdiction, and is to be exercised sparingly where an error apparent on the record causes grave injustice. It cannot be used to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court supervised or to supplant a statutory remedy under the Code; the High Court erred in invoking it to reject the plaint. (¶¶ 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16)
- Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908The Code is self-contained and this rule enumerates the circumstances in which the trial court may reject a plaint. Such rejection is a deemed decree appealable under Section 96; the scheme cannot be upended by a prayer for rejection of the plaint made to the High Court under Article 227. (¶¶ 10, 11, 12, 13)
- Section 96, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908The existence of the appellate remedy against a decree, including a deemed decree rejecting a plaint, operates as a near total bar to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. By rejecting the plaint itself the High Court rendered nugatory the valuable right of appeal the plaintiffs would have had if the trial court had decided the issue. (¶¶ 9, 10, 11, 12)
- Bar of suit (as applied by the High Court), Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988The High Court had rejected the plaint holding the suit barred by this Act. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the merits of that plea and left the respondent free to seek relief before the trial court. (¶¶ 5, 16)
Held
- The power of the High Court under Article 227 is supervisory and exists to ensure that courts and tribunals under its supervision act within the limits of their jurisdiction. It is to be sparingly exercised in cases where errors apparent on the face of the record occasion grave injustice because the court or tribunal assumed a jurisdiction it did not have, failed to exercise a jurisdiction it did have, or exercised its jurisdiction perversely. (¶ 8)
- Being supervisory in essence, the Article 227 power cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court it seeks to supervise, nor to supplant a statutory remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure. The existence of an appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code operates as a near total bar to its exercise. (¶ 9)
- The Code of Civil Procedure is a self-contained code. Order VII Rule 11 enumerates the circumstances in which the trial court may reject a plaint, and such rejection is a deemed decree appealable before the High Court under Section 96. This statutory scheme cannot be upended by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to entertain a prayer for rejection of the plaint. (¶ 10)
- By rejecting the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by law, the High Court supervened the provisions of the Code: it substituted itself as the court of first instance and rendered nugatory the valuable right of appeal that the plaintiffs would have had if the trial court had adjudicated the issue. (¶ 11)
- The observations in Frost (International) Ltd. v. Milan Developers, that a writ under Article 227 may be availed where a revisional court rejects a plaint, do not apply: there the High Court corrected a jurisdictional error of the trial court, whereas here it usurped the trial court's original jurisdiction to reject the plaint. (¶¶ 12, 13)
- Short-circuiting procedure to reach hasty outcomes is an undesirable propensity of an overburdened judiciary; impulses that render procedural safeguards and substantive rights otiose subvert certainty and consistency in law and must be discouraged. Following Jacky v. Tiny, the power under Articles 226 and 227 can in no case be exercised to question a plaint. (¶¶ 14, 15)
Result
Appeal allowed; impugned judgment of the High Court dated 11.07.2024 rejecting the plaint set aside. No opinion expressed on the merits of the respondent's plea for rejection of the plaint; liberty to seek that relief before the trial court in accordance with law.