Summary
A bank employee’s Section 324 conviction for assault did not involve moral turpitude on the particular facts: the criminal courts found simple injuries and no intention to cause death. The Supreme Court therefore upheld reinstatement despite rejecting the High Court’s reasoning that probation itself protected employment. Probation does not confer a right to continued service, and moral turpitude requires assessment of the conduct, motive and circumstances rather than treating every assault conviction as disqualifying.
Issues
- Whether release on probation itself prevented discharge from bank service.
- Whether this assault conviction involved moral turpitude for the statutory employment bar.
Held
- Probation did not entitle the employee to remain in service or bind the employer to the criminal court’s wish to preserve employment. The show-cause notice had identified the statutory basis, so the High Court’s technical and probation-based reasons were incorrect. (¶ 4–5)
- The banking employment bar concerned conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, rather than every criminal conviction. Relevant considerations included societal moral conscience, base motive, depravity, the parties and the circumstances. (¶ 6–8)
- Not every assault or simple-hurt offence involved moral turpitude, though aggravated violence or a dangerous weapon could do so. Here the absence of an intention to kill and the simple nature of the injuries, assessed overall, meant the conviction did not involve moral turpitude. (¶ 9)
- The employee was consequently not liable to discharge on the relied-upon ground. The High Court’s result was affirmed for that reason. (¶ 9–10)
Result
Bank’s appeal dismissed. High Court judgment setting aside discharge and directing reinstatement with one-quarter back wages affirmed, on the ground that this offence did not involve moral turpitude.