Summary
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant under Sections 450 and 376(2) IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act for raping a 15-year-old girl in her home, holding that the victim's clear, natural and consistent testimony, corroborated by her child brother and by the conduct of the family immediately after the incident, was sufficient by itself; the absence of external injuries or categorical medical corroboration could not displace a credible account, and the victim's minority was proved by her school marksheet and her parents' evidence.
Issues
- Whether the prosecution proved that the victim was a minor on the date of the offence so as to attract the POCSO Act.
- Whether the testimony of the prosecutrix could found a conviction when the medical evidence showed no external injuries and was not categorical about sexual assault.
- Whether alleged discrepancies between the evidence of the victim and her younger brother undermined the prosecution case.
Provisions considered
- Section 376(2), Indian Penal Code, 1860The appellant's conviction and sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 376(2), being the more severe punishment compared with that under the POCSO Act, was affirmed; the Court held that in a Section 376 case a credit-worthy account of the victim prevails over apparent insufficiency of medical evidence. (¶¶ 2.1, 5.5, 6.3)
- Section 450, Indian Penal Code, 1860The conviction for house-trespass in order to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for life (five years' rigorous imprisonment) was affirmed along with the other convictions. (¶¶ 2.1, 6.3)
- Section 4, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012The conviction for penetrative sexual assault was affirmed; the plea that the victim was not shown to be a minor was rejected on the strength of her 8th standard marksheet recording her date of birth as 09/10/2002, produced by the investigating officer and corroborated by both parents, giving her age as 15 years 5 months 24 days on 03/04/2018. (¶¶ 2.1, 5, 6.3)
- Section 375, Indian Penal Code, 1860Referring to Wahid Khan, the Court noted that in view of the definition of rape in Section 375 even the slightest penetration suffices, so that an intact hymen or absence of injury does not negate the offence. (¶ 5.5.7)
- Section 114, Illustration (b), Indian Evidence Act, 1872Following Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, the Court observed that a prosecutrix is a victim, not an accomplice, and the Evidence Act contains no rule akin to Illustration (b) to Section 114 requiring corroboration of her evidence. (¶ 5.6.5)
Held
- The victim's minority was established by cogent and reliable evidence: her 8th standard marksheet showing her date of birth, obtained by the investigating officer from her mother and proved through his testimony, corroborated by both parents; the trial court rightly found her to be 15 years 5 months 24 days old on the date of the incident. (¶ 5)
- In cases under Section 376 IPC, where the victim's account is credit-worthy, apparent insufficiency of medical evidence pitted against her acceptable testimony must yield to the latter. Absence of injuries on the private parts does not lead to the conclusion that the incident did not occur or was consensual, and where the victim was overpowered and gagged the absence of major injury marks is explicable. (¶¶ 5.4.1, 5.5, 5.5.4, 5.5.5, 5.5.6)
- Conviction can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence; corroboration is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence, to be insisted upon only for compelling reasons. A victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice and her evidence carries the same weight as that of an injured witness; refusing to act on it without corroboration, as a rule, adds insult to injury. (¶¶ 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.6, 5.6.1, 5.6.3, 5.6.4, 5.6.5, 5.7.1)
- Minor discrepancies not going to the root of the prosecution story are to be ignored; minor variations are often the hallmark of truthful testimony, and only discrepancies that are material and abnormal justify rejecting a witness. No material discrepancy existed between the evidence of the victim and her brother. (¶¶ 5.7, 5.7.2, 5.7.3)
- On the totality of evidence the victim's testimony was probable, natural and trustworthy and was rationally supported by her brother's child-witness account and by her immediate conduct in going to a cousin's house and informing her parents through a relative; the medical evidence being less corroborative or showing no external injury in no way weakened the prosecution case, and the High Court was justified in confirming the conviction and sentence. (¶¶ 5.4, 6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3)
Result
Delay condoned; leave granted; criminal appeal dismissed, conviction and sentence under Sections 450 and 376(2) IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, as confirmed by the High Court, upheld.