Summary
On reopening a death-sentence review for an open-court hearing, the Court confined review to punishment and commuted the sentence for rape and murder of a child to imprisonment for the rest of the convict’s natural life, without reprieve or remission. The sentencing hearing had been ineffective, mitigation and prospects of reform were not properly examined, and the evidentiary circumstances, prolonged effective solitary confinement and medical opinion concerning mental health made confirmation of death unsafe.
Issues
- Whether the death sentence should be commuted in the reopened review in light of the sentencing procedure, mitigation and subsequent circumstances.
Provisions considered
- Section 235(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Required a real, meaningful and effective opportunity to present sentencing material, supported by competent legal assistance and active judicial inquiry even where the accused was silent. (¶¶ 19–22, 39–44, 75–80)
- Section 354(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Death was exceptional and required special reasons based on the crime and the offender, with mitigation and the possibility of reform properly assessed. (¶ 74–77)
Held
- The death-sentence review dismissed by circulation was reopened for hearing in open court under Mohd. Arif. Review was confined to commutation; the concurrent findings of guilt were not reconsidered. (¶ 12–15)
- Bringing the sentencing hearing forward from the notified later date to the conviction date without an effective opportunity to present mitigation reduced the hearing to a formality. Same-day sentencing is not inherently invalid if a meaningful hearing is actually afforded. In this case legal assistance and judicial inquiry were inadequate. (¶¶ 39–44, 75–80)
- The prosecution’s unsupported claim that the convict had managed an earlier acquittal could not serve as an aggravating antecedent. Brutality and the victim’s age alone did not justify death, and there was no material showing that reformation was impossible. (¶¶ 37, 46–53, 74–82)
- The conviction rested on circumstantial evidence and an alleged confession to police leading to recoveries, without forensic evidence against the petitioner. Although circumstantial evidence does not categorically bar death punishment, the quality of evidence was relevant to sentencing and made death unsafe here. (¶¶ 55–62, 81–82)
- Earlier silence on mitigation did not prevent its consideration in a matter of life and death. Given the long pendency, the Court remedied the sentencing breach itself rather than remanding. Prolonged confinement effectively amounting to solitude and medical opinion concerning mental unsoundness also weighed against affirming death. (¶¶ 69–73, 83–86)
- Considering the heinous crime, commutation was to imprisonment for life until natural death without reprieve or remission, rather than a sentence allowing ordinary early release. (¶ 87–91)
Result
Review disposed of; death sentence commuted to life imprisonment until natural death, without reprieve or remission. Conviction remained undisturbed.