Summary
The Supreme Court acquitted a husband convicted by both courts below of strangling his wife, holding that the purely circumstantial case failed: the relatives turned hostile, the doctor conceded tuberculosis and transport of the body as alternative explanations, the recovered rope was commonplace, and Section 106 of the Evidence Act could not fill the gap because the prosecution never made out a prima facie case.
Issues
- Whether the circumstantial evidence, after the material witnesses turned hostile, established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- Whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act cast a burden on the appellant to explain how his wife died inside their dwelling when the prosecution had not first proved a prima facie case.
- What weight the courts below should have given to the appellant's explanation in his statement under Section 313 CrPC that the deceased died of chronic tuberculosis.
Provisions considered
- Section 106, Indian Evidence Act, 1872The State argued that the appellant alone knew what happened inside the jhuggi and had to explain the death. Relying on Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court held that the section does not displace the prosecution's onus and comes into play only after the prosecution proves facts permitting a reasonable inference of guilt; it was not attracted here. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 23)
- Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The appellant stated that the deceased died a natural death from chronic tuberculosis treated at Beas hospital. The courts below ignored this; the prosecution neither re-examined the doctor nor led evidence to dislodge the explanation. (¶ 24)
Held
- Once the brother, sister and cousin of the deceased turned hostile, only formal evidence remained. The post-mortem doctor, though recording asphyxia due to hanging with ligature marks, accepted in cross-examination that asphyxia could result from chronic tuberculosis and the marks could be due to the long journey of the body, so his evidence did not conclusively establish the cause of death. (¶¶ 10, 13, 14, 15, 17)
- Recovery of a rope on the appellant's disclosure carried little weight when the investigating officer admitted that similar ropes were easily available in the market and nothing connected the rope to the crime. (¶¶ 16, 17)
- Tested against the five principles in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, the circumstances did not conclusively establish guilt and left room for a hypothesis consistent with innocence. (¶¶ 18, 19)
- Section 106 of the Evidence Act must be applied with care in criminal cases. It does not modify the rule that the prosecution must prove guilt and cannot be used to make up for the prosecution's failure to prove incriminating circumstances; only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden and a prima facie case is made out does the burden shift to the accused to explain facts within his special knowledge. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23)
- Where the accused, in his Section 313 CrPC statement, gives a specific explanation such as illness and treatment at a named hospital, the prosecution should test it, for instance by re-examining the post-mortem doctor or leading independent evidence; its failure to do so, and the courts' failure to consider the statement, weighed in the accused's favour. (¶ 24)
- Where the evidence admits two conflicting views, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. (¶ 25)
Result
Appeal allowed; the High Court's judgment dated 23.01.2019 upholding the conviction set aside and the appellant acquitted; as he had been in jail for over ten years, he was directed to be released immediately.