Summary
A former judicial officer, then posted as ACJM, was chargesheeted under Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC on a complaint that he had sexual relations with a litigant on a promise to marry her after her divorce, and his discharge plea was rejected by the Sessions Court and the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the complainant, who knew from the outset that the appellant was married though separated and who accepted financial support, made a reasoned choice to sustain the relationship, so no misconception of fact or false pretext of marriage arose; there was no material of fraudulent inducement or threat, and the proceedings were terminated at the stage of charge as an abuse of process.
Issues
- Whether the allegations, taken at face value, constitute offences under Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC.
- Whether consent to a physical relationship given by a woman who knew the accused was in a subsisting marriage, though separated, can be said to have been given under a misconception of fact arising from a promise to marry.
- Whether the appellant was entitled to discharge under Section 227 CrPC.
Provisions considered
- Sections 375 and 376(2)(f), Indian Penal Code, 1860Applying Pramod Suryabhan Pawar, consent must involve active and reasoned deliberation, and is vitiated by a promise to marry only if the promise was false, given in bad faith with no intention of being kept, and bore a direct nexus to the decision to engage in the sexual act. The complainant knew from day one that the appellant was married though separated, and her conduct showed a reasoned choice; even on her own case it was improbable that she engaged in the relationship only on an assurance of marriage. (¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 17, 22)
- Sections 415 and 417, Indian Penal Code, 1860There was no evidence of fraudulent or dishonest inducement; though the appellant was in a position of power, nothing on record established inducement or enticement so as to constitute cheating. (¶ 18)
- Section 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860A bare allegation that the appellant threatened the complainant or her son, with no material showing a threat of injury or to reputation, does not make out criminal intimidation. (¶ 18)
- Section 227, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The question was whether the allegations as they stood constituted the offences and whether the case was fit for discharge; the Court found the relationship consensual and terminated the proceedings at the stage of charge. (¶¶ 7, 13, 20, 22)
Held
- Consent under Section 375 IPC must involve active and reasoned deliberation; to show that it was vitiated by a misconception of fact arising from a promise to marry, the promise must have been false and made in bad faith with no intention of being kept, and must have a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act (Pramod Suryabhan Pawar). (¶ 15)
- A complainant who was aware from the beginning that the accused was in a subsisting marriage though separated, who knew his personal and professional background and accepted financial support for herself and her son, cannot plead misconception of fact or rape on a false pretext of marriage; her conduct reflects a reasoned choice to sustain the relationship, and a prolonged association is inconceivable without voluntary consent (Prashant Bharti; Uday v. State of Karnataka). (¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 17)
- Being in a position of power to exert influence does not by itself establish inducement or enticement for cheating under Section 415 IPC, and a bare allegation of threats does not make out criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC. A material inconsistency between the complainant's Section 164 statement and the chargesheet about how she came to engage the advocate who introduced her to the appellant casts suspicion on her narrative. (¶¶ 18, 19)
- There is a growing tendency to initiate criminal proceedings when relationships turn sour; every consensual relationship in which marriage was a possibility cannot be coloured as a false pretext to marry after a fall-out. Such proceedings are an abuse of process and may be terminated at the stage of charge, particularly where the incident is old and further litigation would only prolong the suffering of parties living separate lives. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22)
Result
Appeal allowed. High Court order dated 23.02.2024 in CRR No. 639 of 2024 set aside and the criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 13/2015, Mahila Police Station, Haldia, terminated at the stage of charge. No order as to costs.