Summary
A death-row convict, sentenced in 1998 for the 1994 murder of five women and two children at Pune and in custody for over 28 years, applied under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 claiming that his real name was Niranaram and that he was 12 years and 6 months old at the time of the offence, relying on a government school register recording his birth as 1 February 1982; a Principal District Judge reported in his favour. The Supreme Court accepted the report: a juvenility plea may be raised at any stage, an earlier in limine dismissal of a writ petition was no bar, the court's inquiry need not follow trial procedure, the school certificate has primacy under Section 94(2) unless shown to be fabricated, and the gravity of the offence cannot defeat a proved claim. The death sentence stood invalidated and he was ordered released forthwith.
Issues
- Whether a claim of juvenility under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 can be raised and determined after the conviction, death sentence and review petition have attained finality, and after a writ petition raising the plea was dismissed in limine.
- What procedure a court must follow in an inquiry under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act, and whether the summons-trial procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure applies.
- Whether the date of birth recorded in a government school admission register, and the certificate issued on its basis, must be accepted under Section 94(2) of the 2015 Act despite inconsistent ages in other documents, the belated claim and the gravity of the offence.
Provisions considered
- Section 9(2) and proviso, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015A claim that the accused was a child on the date of the offence may be raised before any court and shall be recognised at any stage even after final disposal; the court makes an inquiry and takes such evidence as necessary, and the provision does not prescribe trial procedure under the CrPC or the Evidence Act, so the court may formulate its own procedure. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 36)
- Section 94(2), Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015Though addressed to the Board or Committee, its order of priority guides the court: the school date of birth certificate comes first, and if established it must be accepted without resort to lower-ranked documents or an ossification test; the only caveat is that the document must inspire confidence for cogent reasons. (¶¶ 30, 36, 37, 41)
- Section 103, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015The mandate to follow the summons-case procedure applies to inquiries by the Board or Committee, not to an inquiry by a court under Section 9(2). (¶¶ 25, 27, 28)
- Section 35, Indian Evidence Act, 1872The admission register of a government school maintained in the ordinary course of business is a relevant entry; minor sequencing defects, re-stitching and pagination do not show that the register was fabricated. (¶¶ 33, 34)
- Sections 15 and 18, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015A juvenile found to have committed a heinous offence can be denied the benefit of the Act only through the course specified in Section 15; the restriction on the term of detention for a child below 16 applied, and having suffered more than 28 years of imprisonment the applicant was to be set free. (¶¶ 42, 43)
Held
- The applicant discharged his onus of showing that Niranaram, son of Chetanram of Jalabsar, is the person tried and convicted as Narayan: school, tehsildar and family documents consistently name Chetanram as father and Jalabsar as the village from which he was arrested, the State produced nothing to show any other Niranaram or Chetanram there, and a death-row convict in prison for 28 years is under severe limitations in retracing his records. The finding would stand even without the disputed Sarpanch certificate. (¶¶ 15, 17, 18, 19)
- Following Hari Ram and Abdul Razzaq and the proviso to Section 9(2), the juvenility claim may be raised at any stage even after final disposal; the in limine, unreasoned dismissal of a writ petition under Article 32 does not operate as res judicata against a statutory plea under Section 9(2). Murari Thakur, which refused the plea as a belated question of fact, is not good law in view of the proviso, and Pawan, Mohd. Anwar and Surajdeo Mahto turned on their facts and lay down no absolute rule against belated claims. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 36)
- An inquiry by a court under Section 9(2) is a fact-finding inquiry, not an investigation or trial; following Ashwani Kumar Saxena, the CrPC meaning of inquiry cannot be transplanted, and Abuzar Hossain does not dilute that ratio. The procedure adopted, with police verification of documents, hearing both sides and the Court itself calling for the original register, suffered from no flaw. The Court endorses Rishipal Singh Solanki that an inquiry under Section 9(2) proceeds on the lines of Section 94. (¶¶ 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41)
- The original admission register of the government school, of sufficient vintage and maintained in the ordinary course, records the applicant's date of birth as 1 February 1982 at entry 568 without discrepancy; the alleged irregular sequencing, re-admission entries and reverse-stitched page are nitpicking that cannot establish fabrication. The family card with multiple dates was ignored and the electoral roll and chargesheet ages have no specified place under Section 94(2); the ossification range of 22 to 40 years in 2005 is consistent with birth in 1982. The State led no compelling evidence that the entry was false and the court cannot indulge in guesswork to doubt it. (¶¶ 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41)
- Once the Court is satisfied that the claimant was a juvenile on the date of the offence, the gravity or heinousness of the crime cannot be a ground to deny the benefit of the Act; a casual approach to age determination is impermissible, but a decision against juvenility cannot rest solely on the nature of the offence, the legislative exception being Section 15 of the 2015 Act. (¶¶ 41, 42)
Result
Application under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 allowed; date of birth of 1 February 1982 per the school certificate accepted, making the applicant 12 years and 6 months old on the date of the offence; death sentence in Sessions Case No. 462 of 1994, as confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, stands invalidated by operation of law; applicant to be set free forthwith having served more than 28 years; applications to reopen the review petition not entertained; other applications disposed of.