AJMERA SHYAM versus SMT. KOVA LAXMI & ORS. (14/08/2025) — Supreme Court headnote

AI-generated headnote. Verify against the judgment before relying on it. Paragraph numbers refer to the judgment.

Summary

The Supreme Court dismissed an election petitioner's appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, holding that the returned candidate's failure to state in her Form 26 affidavit the income shown in her income tax returns for four of the last five financial years (entered as 'NIL'), while fully disclosing her assets, liabilities, profession and sources of income, was a technical defect not of substantial character. It therefore neither rendered the acceptance of her nomination improper under Section 100(1)(d)(i), nor amounted to a corrupt practice of undue influence under Section 123(2) read with Section 100(1)(b), nor attracted Section 100(1)(d)(iv). The Court distinguished non-disclosure of criminal antecedents, which must be treated strictly, from non-disclosure of assets, which calls for a substantiality test balanced against the people's mandate.

Issues

Whether showing income as 'NIL' for four of the last five financial years in the Form 26 affidavit, instead of the income per income tax returns, made the acceptance of the nomination improper so as to void the election under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Whether such non-disclosure constitutes a corrupt practice of undue influence under Section 123(2), rendering the election void under Section 100(1)(b).
Whether the non-disclosure violated Rule 4A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 so as to materially affect the result and void the election under Section 100(1)(d)(iv).
Whether the returned candidate failed to disclose her Zilla Parishad honorarium and an ex-MLA pension.

Provisions considered

Section 100(1)(a), (b), (d)(i) and (d)(iv), Representation of the People Act, 1951The Court classified the grounds: clause (a) (not qualified/disqualified) is objective and admits no substantiality inquiry; clause (b) (corrupt practice) concerns acts during the election and brooks no leniency; the grounds of improper acceptance of nomination and non-compliance with the Act or rules are largely technical and involve subjectivity because Section 36(4) bars rejection for a defect not of substantial character. Since the defect here was not substantial, none of clauses (d)(i), (b) or (d)(iv) was attracted. (¶¶ 9.3, 9.3.1, 9.3.2, 9.3.3, 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.33, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4)
Section 36(4), Representation of the People Act, 1951The Returning Officer shall not reject a nomination for a defect that is not of a substantial character; if the defect is not substantial, acceptance of the nomination cannot be deemed improper for Section 100(1)(d)(i), and by the same standard it is neither a corrupt practice nor material non-compliance. (¶¶ 9.3.3, 10.10, 10.11, 10.12)
Section 123(2) (undue influence), Representation of the People Act, 1951Following Lok Prahari and S. Rukmini Madegowda, non-disclosure or false declaration of assets can be a corrupt practice of undue influence, but the non-disclosure of income per tax returns here was not of a substantial nature and so was not a corrupt practice; a charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal and must be proved to the hilt. (¶¶ 9.11.2, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9, 10.34, 11.3)
Sections 33A, 33B and 125A, Representation of the People Act, 1951Section 33A (inserted in 2002) mandates disclosure only of specified criminal antecedents; Section 33B, which sought to limit disclosure to what the Act required, was struck down in PUCL; Section 125A penalises false affidavits. Disclosure of assets and educational qualifications rests not on any section of the Act but on Form 26 under Rule 4A, having evolved through judicial directions. (¶¶ 8.10, 8.11, 8.12, 8.14, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 9.5, 9.6)
Rule 4A and Form 26 (clause 4), Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961Rule 4A requires an affidavit in Form 26 with the nomination; clause 4 requires PAN and income per income tax returns for the last five financial years. Entering 'NIL' for four years violated the mandate and made the affidavit defective, but as the column was not left blank (which would have been fatal under Resurgence India) and assets and income sources were otherwise fully disclosed, the defect was technical and not substantial. (¶¶ 8.19, 10.3, 10.4, 10.23, 10.26, 10.27)
Section 83 read with Rule 94A and Form 25, Representation of the People Act, 1951An election petition alleging corrupt practice must contain a concise statement of material facts, be verified as in the CPC and be accompanied by a Form 25 affidavit disclosing the source of information; the procedure must be strictly followed. (¶¶ 6.7, 9.11.2)
Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of IndiaThe voter's right to know candidates' antecedents, assets and qualifications is part of the freedom of speech and expression (ADR, PUCL, Resurgence India), but it must be balanced against the people's mandate once the result is declared. (¶¶ 8.6, 8.8, 8.12, 8.21, 9.10.5, 9.10.6)

Held

Disclosure of criminal antecedents and disclosure of assets and educational qualifications do not stand on the same pedestal: the former, now embodied in Section 33A, was the prime object of judicial intervention and must be examined scrupulously and strictly; the latter are attending requirements that rest on Form 26 under Rule 4A rather than any provision of the Act, and there is scope to consider whether a non-disclosure is substantial or inconsequential. There is no disqualification based on wealth, and the purpose of asset disclosure is mainly to allow later evaluation of disproportionate enrichment through public office. (¶¶ 8.23, 8.24, 9.5, 9.6, 9.8, 9.9, 11.1)
Once the electorate has delivered its verdict, the people's mandate is a new dimension the court cannot overlook: a fine balance must be struck between the voters' right to information and the sanctity of the mandate, and an election should not be voided for minor technical or insignificant non-disclosure of assets; courts should intervene only where clear and blatant violations, fraud or corrupt practices compromise the integrity of the process, and must not become tools that undermine the popular mandate in the name of technical perfection. (¶¶ 9.10.2, 9.10.6, 9.10.7, 9.10.8, 10.34)
Non-disclosure of assets that is not a material defect of substantial character does not make acceptance of the nomination improper; whether a non-disclosure is substantial turns on the facts of each case (Karikho Kri); and if the defect is not substantial it is equally not a corrupt practice under Section 100(1)(b) nor material non-compliance under Section 100(1)(d)(iv). The true test is whether the non-disclosure is of consequential or inconsequential import. (¶¶ 10.10, 10.11, 10.12, 10.28, 10.35)
An income tax return is intrinsically related to a person's assets and sources of income and merely provides a reference framework for taxation; it is not a statement of the existence of assets. Where assets, income and sources of income are otherwise fully disclosed and undisputed, omitting the income per tax returns for some years is a technical defect that does not amount to hiding assets (it withholds information relating to assets, not of assets); the position would differ if it were averred and shown that returns were withheld to hide real income or disproportionate wealth. (¶¶ 10.22, 10.23, 10.24, 10.25, 10.26, 10.29)
The allegations of non-disclosure of the ex-MLA pension and Zilla Parishad honorarium failed: the candidate's non-drawal certificate for the pension was unrebutted, and the honorarium was disclosed as her source of income in paragraph 9 of the affidavit, so omission of the amount was not concealment. (¶¶ 10.20, 10.21, 11.5)
Failure to object at the Returning Officer's scrutiny under Section 36 does not bar a later election petition and creates no estoppel, but failure to raise easily discernible deficiencies at scrutiny casts doubt on the election petitioner's bona fides and prompts minute examination of the claim; an unproved assertion that an agent objected verbally (the agent not having been examined) is of no consequence, and the court's process should not become a legal gamble after an electoral defeat. (¶¶ 10.30, 10.31)
On the facts, the non-disclosure of income per income tax returns for four financial years was not a defect of substantial character; the Returning Officer committed no illegality in accepting the nomination, the election could not be voided under Section 100(1)(d)(i), the candidate committed no corrupt practice under Section 123(2) so Section 100(1)(b) was not attracted, and Section 100(1)(d)(iv) was likewise inapplicable. (¶¶ 11.2, 11.3, 11.4)

Result

Appeal dismissed as devoid of merit; High Court's dismissal of the election petition upheld; parties to bear their own costs; Registry to notify the authorities under Section 116C(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.