Summary
A known child in conflict with law could not be directly prosecuted as an adult before the Sessions Court without the Board’s preliminary assessment, transfer decision and Children’s Court scrutiny. Those mandatory safeguards were bypassed despite juvenile status being known from inception; later sentencing-stage assessments could not validate the trial. A fresh retrospective assessment years later was considered futile. The Court quashed the impugned judgment and ordered release unless required elsewhere, expressly leaving evidentiary guilt unexamined.
Issues
- Whether direct adult trial of the known juvenile complied with the 2015 Act.
- Whether later psychological or sentencing assessments cured the foundational breach.
- Whether retrospective assessment and a fresh trial should be ordered.
Provisions considered
- Sections 2(13), 3 and 9, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015Known juvenile status required the statutory child-justice route and forwarding to the Board; child-friendly sentencing after an adult trial did not cure the breach. (¶¶ 8, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 40, 41, 42, 43)
- Sections 15, 18(3), 19 and 101(2), Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015For the relevant sixteen-plus heinous-offence category, Board assessment and any adult-trial transfer must precede independent Children’s Court scrutiny; omission vitiated the proceedings. (¶¶ 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 46, 47, 48)
Held
- The investigating officer, prosecution and trial court all knew from the beginning that the accused was a child at the incident. Even assuming the Sessions Court was duly designated as a Children’s Court, it could not bypass the Board and directly accept the chargesheet for this adult trial. (¶¶ 8, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 37, 38)
- For the statutory heinous-offence category involving a child aged sixteen or above, Section 15 requires preliminary assessment of capacity, understanding of consequences and circumstances. Any Section 18(3) transfer must follow that process, and the Children’s Court must independently decide the need for adult trial under Section 19. These safeguards are mandatory and consequential, not empty formalities. (¶¶ 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39)
- Post-trial psychological evaluation and attempts to apply child-specific sentencing provisions could not supply ex post facto approval of a fundamentally unlawful prosecution. Cases where juvenile status was discovered only after final adjudication were distinguished from this known-from-inception case. (¶¶ 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45)
- A fresh Board assessment was declined in the particular circumstances: years after the incident and with the appellant now an adult, there was no realistic possibility of reconstructing his relevant mental and physical capacity and understanding at the time. Retrospective remand would be futile here. (¶¶ 46, 47, 48)
- Because the proceedings were vitiated by the mandatory-procedure breaches, the Court did not reappraise the circumstantial evidence or determine whether guilt was proved. The impugned judgment was quashed and set aside, release ordered forthwith unless required in another case, and the appeal allowed. (¶¶ 49, 50, 51, 52)
Result
Appeal allowed; impugned judgment quashed and set aside for vitiated juvenile-justice proceedings. Immediate release directed unless required in another case; evidentiary guilt not adjudicated and pending applications disposed of.