Summary
The Court restored disproportionate-assets proceedings against a police officer. The re-employed Joint Director validly authorised the investigation, and the de facto doctrine also protected his official acts. The informant’s participation in investigation did not justify quashing this earlier prosecution under the authorities applied. Preliminary inquiry was not mandatory in every corruption case where credible information disclosed a cognizable offence. Sanction questions could be examined during trial, and the pre-2018 substantive law governed.
Issues
- Whether the re-employed officer validly authorised investigation and whether the informant could investigate this prosecution.
- Whether absence of preliminary inquiry, sanction or application of the 2018 amendments justified quashing.
Provisions considered
- Section 17(c) and second proviso, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988The Deputy Superintendent was validly authorised to investigate the disproportionate-assets case by the officer discharging Joint Director duties. (¶¶ 6, 7, 21, 23)
Held
- The State could re-employ the retired officer under its executive power without contravening statutory rules. He discharged Joint Director duties under State authority, and his authorisation in the public interest was also protected by the de facto doctrine. His employment could not be collaterally adjudicated in the quashing petition. (¶¶ 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23)
- The High Court could not quash this earlier prosecution merely because the informant initiated the investigation. Applying Varinder Kumar, the Court treated the rule in Mohan Lal as prospective and required earlier prosecutions to be governed by their individual facts. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26)
- Lalita Kumari did not mandate preliminary inquiry in every corruption case. Its necessity and manner depended on the circumstances; credible information here disclosed a cognizable offence and supported registration without a separate preliminary inquiry. (¶¶ 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34)
- The sanction objection and allegation that investigators waited for retirement did not justify quashing. Whether sanction was necessary for prosecution of the retired officer could be examined during trial. (¶¶ 35, 36)
- Whether an offence had been committed had to be examined under the statute preceding the amendment of 26 July 2018, rather than the amended provisions. (¶ 37)
Result
State’s Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 2019 allowed; quashing order set aside and matter remitted to the trial court for further proceedings according to law. Accused officer’s Criminal Appeal No. 1663 of 2019 dismissed.