Summary
The Court set aside concurrent murder convictions because the sole supporting eyewitness’s presence and account were seriously doubtful. His conduct, the hospital record, lack of corroboration and unresolved compatibility of the recovered broken-tip knife with the injuries undermined proof beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling applied the general permissibility of conviction on one wholly reliable witness while finding that standard unmet on these facts.
Issues
- Whether the sole supporting eyewitness was sufficiently reliable to sustain conviction.
- Whether the medical record and failure to obtain an opinion on the recovered knife materially undermined the prosecution case.
Provisions considered
- Section 134, Indian Evidence Act, 1872Applied the principle that the quality of evidence, rather than the number of witnesses, determines whether a sole account can sustain conviction. (¶¶ 16, 17, 25, 32)
Held
- There is no legal impediment to conviction on a single wholly reliable eyewitness. Where that testimony itself raises doubts, corroboration is needed; evidence must be weighed rather than counted. (¶¶ 16, 17)
- The witness’s claimed presence was doubtful in light of his conduct, the other alleged eyewitnesses’ failure to support the account, and the hospital record initially identifying the injured as unknown and naming the police officer as the person bringing him. These circumstances made uncorroborated reliance unsafe. (¶¶ 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25)
- The medical evidence and asserted duration further undermined the account. The recovered knife had a broken, blunt tip, but it was not shown to the doctor for an opinion on compatibility with the stab and incised wounds. Though minor investigative lapses ordinarily do not defeat reliable eyewitness evidence, this omission was material amid the other doubts. (¶¶ 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31)
- Concurrent findings did not preclude interference where inherent improbabilities and the unreliable sole account left the alleged offences unproved beyond reasonable doubt. The appellants were entitled to benefit of doubt. (¶¶ 32, 33, 34, 35)
Result
Appeals allowed. Impugned conviction and sentence orders set aside; appellants directed to be released forthwith unless required in another case.