Summary
Three appellants convicted in a 1982 bank fraud case under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120B IPC read with Section 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 appealed. The Court set aside the conviction of the third appellant because an inquiry under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 established that he was a juvenile when the offence was committed, and set aside the conviction of the other two because their examination under Section 313 CrPC consisted of four mechanical questions that did not put the incriminating evidence to them, a serious irregularity that could not be cured by remand more than four decades after the offence.
Issues
- Whether the third appellant, found on inquiry under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to have been a juvenile on the date of the offence, could be remanded to the Juvenile Justice Board decades later or whether his conviction and sentence should simply be set aside.
- Whether recording the accused's statements under Section 313 CrPC by putting only four general, identical questions without putting the specific incriminating evidence to them vitiated the trial.
- Whether, given the passage of time since the 1982 offence and the 2006 trial, the defect in the Section 313 CrPC examination could be cured by remand or whether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Provisions considered
- Section 7A, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000A claim of juvenility may be raised before any court at any stage, even after final disposal; the court must inquire, take evidence and record a finding on age, and if the person is found to have been a juvenile on the date of the offence, he is to be forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board and any sentence passed is deemed to have no effect. On the Supreme Court's direction the Special Judge inquired and, on the matriculation certificate, school register and CBI confirmation of the date of birth 24.12.1965, declared the third appellant a juvenile in September to December 1982. (¶¶ 7, 19, 20, 22, 23)
- Sections 14 and 15, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000Ordinarily a person found to be a juvenile is dealt with by the Juvenile Justice Board, which inquires under Section 14 and may pass orders under Section 15 including sending the juvenile to a special home for up to three years. More than four decades after the offence, remand to the Board for this exercise was held neither possible nor feasible. (¶¶ 21, 23)
- Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The provision enables the accused personally to explain every circumstance appearing in the evidence against him; the court must put each material circumstance specifically, distinctly and separately. Four identical general questions put mechanically to all three appellants, without the specific prosecution evidence, breached Section 313 and the principle of audi alteram partem, and the unexplained evidence was then relied on to convict. (¶¶ 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37)
Held
- Under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 a plea of juvenility may be raised and recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case. Where the inquiry conducted by the Special Judge on the Supreme Court's direction, supported by the matriculation certificate, the school register and the CBI's own confirmation, established that the third appellant was about 17 years old when the offence was committed, his juvenility stood established. (¶¶ 19, 20, 22, 23)
- Although a person found to be a juvenile would ordinarily be forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board for inquiry under Section 14 and orders under Section 15 of the JJ Act, where more than four decades have passed since the offence it is neither possible nor feasible to remand the matter to the Board; the conviction and sentence of the juvenile appellant were therefore set aside on the ground of juvenility. (¶ 23)
- The trial court must draw the accused's attention under Section 313 CrPC to every inculpatory circumstance, specifically and separately, so that he can explain it; this is the basic fairness of a criminal trial. Material circumstances not put to the accused must ordinarily be excluded from consideration, and failure to put them is a serious irregularity which vitiates the trial if prejudice is shown; whether such a defect is curable depends among other things on the passage of time since the incident. (¶¶ 30, 31, 32, 33, 34)
- Putting only four general, identical questions to each appellant in a mechanical manner, without reflecting the specific prosecution evidence against them, was a clear breach of Section 313 CrPC and of audi alteram partem which caused serious prejudice, since the court then relied on that very evidence to convict them; the omission vitiated the trial. (¶¶ 28, 35, 36, 37)
- Even treating the defect as curable, with the offence dating from 1982 and the trial having concluded in 2006, a remand to re-record the Section 313 CrPC statements at this distance of time would cause rather than cure a miscarriage of justice; the appellants were therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt and their conviction and sentence became untenable. (¶¶ 37, 38, 39)
Result
Appeal allowed; the trial court's judgment dated 29.05.2006 and the High Court's judgment dated 24.11.2011 set aside, qua the third appellant on the ground of juvenility and qua the first and second appellants for breach of Section 313 CrPC; the appellants being on bail, their bail bonds cancelled.