Summary
Forest guards who topped their training challenged a judgment denying the benefit of a 1977 order permitting further training without an entrance examination. The Court held that the 2009 communications had not validly withdrawn that order; express revocation followed only in June 2012. It also stressed that the Division Bench had relied on a withdrawal case the writ petitioners had not pleaded. The appeals were allowed and the impugned judgments set aside.
Issues
- Whether the 2009 communications revoked the 1977 government order concerning training incentives.
- Whether the order conflicted with recruitment rules and whether the High Court could decide on an unpleaded basis.
Provisions considered
- Article 166, Constitution of IndiaApplying Bachhittar Singh, the Court assessed whether the communications constituted a government order capable of revoking the earlier order. (¶¶ 11, 14-15)
- Rule 6(4), read with Rule 14(1) and Schedule IV, Madhya Pradesh Class III (Non-Ministerial) Forest Service Recruitment Rules, 1967The power to prescribe another recruitment method in service exigencies answered the contention that the 1977 order necessarily contradicted the ordinary promotional route. (¶ 13-14)
Held
- The pre-reorganisation government order continued until revoked in the legally prescribed manner. The May 2009 communication ended by seeking a proposal, and the December 2009 departmental communication lacked the character of a government order revoking the earlier decision. The June 2012 order, by contrast, was expressly issued in the Governor’s name and specifically revoked the 1977 order. (¶ 15)
- Although the ordinary rules prescribed qualifying service for promotion, Rule 6(4) allowed the government, in service exigencies, to prescribe another recruitment method by order. The statutory framework therefore did not support treating the 1977 arrangement as necessarily contrary to the rules. (¶ 14)
- Proper pleadings determine the issues the parties must meet. The writ petitioners relied on the December 2009 communication as effecting withdrawal, whereas the Division Bench proceeded on withdrawal by the May 2009 communication. Its reasoning on that basis could not be sustained. (¶ 15)
Result
Appeals allowed. The impugned judgments were set aside, with no order as to costs.