Summary
The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had reversed the acquittal of an insurance company officer in a CBI bribery trap case and restored the acquittal, holding that the prosecution had not proved demand and acceptance of the bribe beyond reasonable doubt: the alleged conspiracy rested on inference from a phone call whose contents were unknown, the co-accused senior officer had himself forwarded a complaint against the appellant to vigilance a month earlier, and three glaring contradictions (the SP's undisclosed participation in the trap shown by his tour diary, a 'white' shirt exhibited as moss-coloured, and phenolphthalein traces on a whisky box never treated with the powder) shook the foundation of the trap.
Issues
- Whether the prosecution proved, by the standard laid down in Neeraj Dutta, the demand of illegal gratification by the appellant and its acceptance so as to sustain convictions under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B IPC.
- Whether the High Court could draw an adverse inference of conspiracy from the appellant's denial of a telephone call to the co-accused when the contents of the conversation were not in evidence.
- Whether the High Court, while reversing an acquittal, adequately addressed the material contradictions in the trap and post-trap evidence, including the role of the Superintendent of Police, the colour of the seized shirt and the phenolphthalein test on the whisky box.
- Whether, where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence, the appellate court was justified in disturbing the trial court's acquittal.
Provisions considered
- Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Applying the five-Judge Bench summary in Neeraj Dutta, proof of demand and acceptance (or obtainment) of illegal gratification as a fact in issue is a sine qua non; the sole circumstance that the demand was allegedly for liaison with the Regional Manager, and the uncorroborated word of the complainant, did not prove demand, and the appellant was nowhere in the picture at the actual trap. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 29, 37, 38)
- Section 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860The conspiracy between the appellant and the Regional Manager rested only on a phone call whose contents were not available; the Court found it contrary to normal human conduct for the Regional Manager, who had forwarded a bribery complaint against the appellant to the Vigilance Officer a month earlier, to conspire with him, and held the High Court's finding of conspiracy to be based on inference and conjecture. (¶¶ 13, 27, 28, 29)
- Article 20(3), Constitution of IndiaEven if the phone call was made, the appellant could not be compelled to disclose the nature and content of the conversation; the High Court erred in drawing an adverse inference from his denial. (¶ 28)
- Section 91, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Where the trial court, having seen the material object, found the 'white' shirt exhibited to be moss-coloured, the High Court should either have summoned the material object for its own examination under Section 91 or accepted the trial court's finding, instead of speculating that the colour had withered due to dust. (¶ 32)
- Section 378, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Following Jafarudheen, an order of acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence, creating a double presumption that may be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on accepted legal parameters; the High Court failed to provide cogent reasons addressing the weakest links of the prosecution case. (¶¶ 34, 35)
Held
- The fact that a claim file had already been cleared at the accused officer's level does not by itself negate a demand allegedly made for liaison with a senior officer, but that sole circumstance cannot prove the factum of demand either. (¶¶ 25, 26)
- Where the only evidence of conspiracy is the fact of a telephone call between the accused and the contents are not in evidence, a court cannot draw an adverse inference from the accused's denial of the call and treat it as conspiratorial talk; such a finding rests on conjecture, and the protection of Article 20(3) means the accused could not be compelled to disclose the conversation. (¶¶ 27, 28)
- It militates against normal human conduct that a senior officer who had, a month earlier, forwarded a complaint of bribe demand against the accused to the Vigilance Officer would enter into a conspiracy with the same officer; likewise, a complainant aware of that vigilance reference would not approach the same officer with a bribe. The allegation of demand was therefore shrouded in dubiety, and the senior officer's instruction to keep the file pending, though suspicious for want of an endorsement, was consistent with the pending vigilance inquiry. (¶¶ 28, 29)
- Three glaring contradictions cumulatively destroyed the prosecution case: the SP's signed tour diary showed he reached Hyderabad and participated in the only trap registered that week, falsifying the trap officer's evidence and corroborating the defence of a frame-up; the shirt seized as 'white' was exhibited as moss-coloured, and the High Court's explanation that dust had altered its colour was an incredulous and irrational leap; and phenolphthalein was recovered from a whisky box to which, per the pre-trap mediators' report, no powder had been applied, the High Court's theory of transfer via the complainant's hands being a conjectural assumption impermissible in a criminal trial. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33)
- An appellate court reversing an acquittal faces a double presumption of innocence and must give cogent reasons addressing the weakest links in the prosecution version; engaging deeply with minor inconsistencies while glossing over the most glaring contradictions reflects lack of care. Where two views are possible, the court must lean in favour of the defence. (¶¶ 30, 33, 34, 35, 36)
- In trap cases, independent witnesses of the trap team should corroborate the demand made by the accused before the trap is set in motion; where only the complainant spoke of the demand and the accused was absent at the trap, the procedure suffered from a serious lacuna. The mere fact that the person who received the money was the accused's brother raises no presumption in law that the money was meant for the accused pursuant to his demand. (¶ 37)
- The prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the demand and acceptance of the bribe; at best the case was a botched trap with serious investigative lapses and at worst a fabrication, and in either scenario the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. (¶ 38)
Result
Appeal allowed. The High Court's judgment dated 21.08.2015/09.09.2015 in Criminal Appeal No. 548 of 2006 set aside and the trial court's judgment of acquittal dated 07.06.2005 restored; the appellant acquitted of all charges and held entitled to refund of any fine deposited.