Summary
A mother, appointed by an Idaho court as full and permanent guardian of her 22-year-old son who has Ataxic Cerebral Palsy and mild intellectual disability, challenged the Madras High Court's dismissal of her habeas corpus petition after the father had brought the son from the US to Chennai during pending guardianship proceedings. The Supreme Court, relying on a multidisciplinary NIMHANS assessment and the Idaho evaluation reports, held that the son functions at the level of an 8-to-10-year-old and cannot make independent, legally binding decisions, so his stated wish to stay with his father could not found a finding of consensual residence; applying the parens patriae doctrine and the best-interests test, it directed that he return to the US with his brother under the mother's guardianship.
Issues
- Whether an adult with intellectual disability and cerebral palsy, assessed as functioning at the cognitive level of an 8-to-10-year-old child, is capable of making independent, legally binding decisions about his place of residence such that his expressed preference negates illegal detention in habeas corpus proceedings.
- What weight a court must give to expert medical opinion on a person's decision-making capacity, and whether the High Court could decide the matter on a brief oral interaction alone.
- Whether the son's best interests and welfare, judged under the parens patriae doctrine and in light of a pre-existing foreign guardianship order, are served by his continuing to reside with his father in India or by returning to the US under his mother's guardianship.
Provisions considered
- Act generally (as construed in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn.), Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971Distinguished: deference to the wishes of a woman with mild to moderate intellectual disability in Suchita Srivastava flowed from the language of the MTP Act requiring respect for a major's decision, the late stage of pregnancy and institutional assurances; no statute prescribes a course of action here and no life-threatening consequence follows, so that decision does not support the father's reliance on the son's wishes. (¶¶ 28, 29)
Held
- Where there is doubt about a person's capacity to make independent decisions and a specialist or domain expert has given a definitive opinion on disability, the court must give due credence to that opinion. If the expert finds the person's mental or physical age to be well below the age of majority, no implied or express consent can be inferred to any act having a substantive impact on that person, and unless there are strong reasons to disbelieve the report the court must be overly cautious before finding to the contrary. (¶¶ 20, 22)
- Courts may depart from an expert's report but cannot discard it wholesale without reason. In a habeas corpus matter concerning alleged illegal detention of a person with severe cognitive limitations, the High Court ought to have considered the Idaho Evaluation Committee's report and, if in doubt, ordered an enquiry through a reputable medical institution; deciding on a few minutes' oral interaction, without dealing with the medical assessments or school records, was hasty and misconceived. (¶¶ 19, 20)
- On the concurrent findings of NIMHANS, Bengaluru and the Idaho Evaluation Committee, the son has mild intellectual disability with overall functioning equivalent to an 8-to-10-year-old child and 80 per cent overall disability, can make basic personal decisions but lacks capacity for complex, informed decisions on residence, financial, legal, social and occupational matters, and can be easily manipulated. He therefore cannot make independent, legally binding decisions, and the High Court erred in treating his perceived choice to live in India as negating illegal detention. The Kilpauk Institute of Mental Health report relied on by the father was unreliable as it took history only from the father and did not disclose its methods, and in any event itself recorded that he needs support for major decisions. (¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23)
- Once a person is found incapable of independent decision-making, the court under the parens patriae doctrine must determine what best serves his interests and welfare. Girish v. Radhamony K. (a fully functioning adult) and Suchita Srivastava (statute-driven deference) do not support treating the person's wishes as the sole criterion. (¶¶ 24, 27, 28, 29)
- The principle of comity of courts and a pre-existing foreign court order must yield to the best interests of the person concerned, especially where the court undertakes an elaborate enquiry; the foreign order is only one circumstance to be weighed. The court must consider the totality of circumstances, including stability and security, loving care, health, education, intellectual development, favourable surroundings, future prospects and moral and ethical values. (¶¶ 30, 31, 32)
- The son's best interests lie in returning to the US: he was born and raised there, has specialised schooling, welfare services, a peer group and an established routine there, had been interrupted in a transitional vocational programme solely by the unplanned trip to India, has received little structured training in India and struggles with the local language, wishes to live with his younger brother (who has similar disabilities and with whom the bond is a foundational source of security), and is already under the mother's guardianship by order of the Idaho court. He has not given up his roots in the US or developed new roots in India. The father remains free, and bound, to be part of the life his son has established in the US. (¶¶ 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39)
Result
Appeal allowed; Madras High Court judgment dated 09.08.2024 set aside. The son is deemed in the appellant's sole custody; she is to return to the US with both sons within 15 days, the father not to impede this; US Consulate-General, Chennai to return his passport; parents to exchange contact details and neither to restrict the sons' access to the other; contempt proceedings dropped; pending applications disposed of.