Summary
The Court restored a decree for specific performance, holding that the purchaser’s pleadings and conduct established readiness and willingness. Section 16(c) required substantive compliance rather than ritual wording, and the High Court lacked grounds to reverse the non-perverse concurrent findings in second appeal. Refusal of relief under the former discretionary regime also lacked sound reasons on these facts, particularly given the subsequent purchasers’ knowledge of the agreement. Execution of the sale deed and delivery of possession were directed within four weeks.
Issues
- Whether the pleadings and evidence satisfied the requirement of readiness and willingness for specific performance.
- Whether the High Court could overturn concurrent findings and deny equitable relief in second appeal on these facts.
Provisions considered
- Section 16(c), as applicable to the suit, Specific Relief Act, 1963The pleadings as a whole and the purchaser’s conduct satisfied readiness and willingness without prescribed ritual phrasing. (¶¶ 6, 6.1, 8, 9)
- Section 20, before the 2018 substitution, Specific Relief Act, 1963Discretion required sound judicial reasons; the circumstances did not justify denying the established purchaser’s relief. (¶¶ 10, 10.1, 11)
- Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908The High Court could not displace the supported concurrent factual findings merely through an unduly technical view of the pleadings. (¶¶ 7, 8, 10.1)
Held
- Readiness and willingness had to be pleaded and proved in substance, reading the entire plaint rather than insisting on a particular verbal formula. Payments covering most of the consideration, extensions requested by the vendor and the obligation to pay the balance on execution supported the findings here. (¶¶ 6, 6.1, 8, 9)
- Concurrent findings based on the evidence were neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Their reversal in second appeal on the supposed absence of necessary averments was erroneous. (¶¶ 7, 8)
- The former Section 20 discretion was judicial rather than arbitrary. The High Court supplied no cogent basis for denying specific performance and had not framed an issue on that ground. Subsequent purchasers with notice could not rely on long possession and litigation delay to defeat the plaintiff’s established entitlement. (¶¶ 10, 10.1, 11)
- The Court referred to the later legislative change as guidance but expressly left its retrospective application and application to pending proceedings open. The decision did not finally resolve those questions. (¶ 10)
- The original specific-performance decree was restored, with the vendor’s legal representatives and subsequent purchasers directed to execute the deed and deliver peaceful vacant possession within four weeks. (¶ 12)
Result
Appeal allowed without costs; High Court judgment set aside and original specific-performance decree restored. Defendants directed to execute the sale deed and hand over peaceful vacant possession within four weeks.