Summary
Answering a reference following a split decision, the Court held that a Judicial Magistrate could order a person to provide a voice sample for criminal investigation pending express legislation. The power was supplied through judicial interpretation and Article 142 in light of the statutory gap. A comparison sample did not constitute compelled self-incriminatory testimony under Article 20(3). The separate privacy issue was not fully decided because it had not been specifically argued.
Issues
- Whether compelled provision of a comparison voice sample attracts the protection against self-incrimination.
- Whether a Magistrate could order a voice sample despite the absence of express provision in the then Code.
Held
- The constitutional prohibition concerns compelled self-incriminatory testimony conveying personal knowledge. Comparison specimens do not by themselves supply such testimony; the Court followed Kathi Kalu Oghad in rejecting the Article 20(3) objection. (¶¶ 5–6, 9, 19)
- The then amendments concerning medical examinations, specimen signatures and handwriting did not expressly provide for voice samples. The Court addressed that acknowledged gap rather than treating an express voice-sample provision as already enacted. (¶ 10–15)
- Until Parliament inserted explicit provisions, a Judicial Magistrate was to possess power to order a person to provide a voice sample for investigating crime. The Court conferred that power through judicial interpretation and exercise of Article 142 jurisdiction. (¶ 20–25)
- The Court noted that privacy is not absolute and may yield to compelling public interest, but declined further examination or a fuller ruling on an issue not specifically argued before it. (¶ 24)
Result
Reference answered and appeals disposed of in those terms. Judicial Magistrates empowered to order investigatory voice samples pending express Parliamentary provision; no finding on the accused person’s guilt.