Summary
The Supreme Court upheld the appellant's conviction for house-trespass, gang rape, murder and offences under the POCSO Act, resting on a reliable question-answer dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate and corroborated by oral dying declarations, but commuted the death sentence because the case was not shown to be beyond reform, substituting a fixed term of 20 years' imprisonment without remission.
Issues
- Whether the conviction, resting mainly on the deceased's dying declarations, was sustainable despite the alleged inconsistencies and improvements in them.
- Whether the case fell in the 'rarest of rare' category warranting confirmation of the death penalty, or whether the sentence should be commuted.
Provisions considered
- Sections 302 and 376A, Indian Penal Code, 1860Conviction under these provisions (read with Section 34) was maintained, but the death penalty awarded under them was commuted to rigorous imprisonment for a fixed term of 20 years without remission, applying the middle path between death and ordinary life imprisonment. (¶¶ 9, 17, 18, 19)
- Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The deceased's statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under this provision was treated as further support for the prosecution case alongside the dying declarations. (¶ 8)
Held
- The dying declaration recorded in question-answer form by the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar), with the Medical Officer's endorsements of fit mental state both before and after it, was reliable and clearly implicated the appellant. It was corroborated by the oral dying declarations deposed to by family members, by a defence witness who heard the deceased say she had been raped and set on fire, by her statement under Section 164 CrPC and by the Dehat Nalishi; the concurrent conviction therefore called for no interference. (¶¶ 7, 8, 9)
- Age at the time of the offence cannot by itself justify commutation, but it can be weighed along with other factors in deciding whether a death sentence should be commuted. (¶ 14)
- The appellant was 22 at the time of the offence, came from a socio-economically backward background, had lost his mother and elder brother in childhood, had no criminal antecedents and showed satisfactory conduct in prison according to the psychological, probation and jail reports. He could not be called a hardened criminal incapable of reform, so confirming the death penalty was not justified. (¶¶ 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17)
- Ordinary life imprisonment, meaning 14 years with remission, would not meet the ends of justice either; following the line of decisions beginning with Swamy Shraddananda (2), the case fell in the middle path, and the death sentence was commuted to a fixed term of 20 years' imprisonment without remission. (¶¶ 17, 18, 19)
Result
Appeals partly allowed; conviction maintained; death sentence under Sections 376A and 302 IPC commuted to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years without remission.