Summary
Setting aside a High Court order that quashed a bribery-trap prosecution because the employee had been exonerated in departmental proceedings, the Court held that the exoneration was not on merits. It rested on the trap Inspector not being examined. Disciplinary and criminal proceedings conducted by different entities are independent, and the case is governed by Ajay Kumar Tyagi, not Radheshyam Kejriwal. The prosecution will continue.
Issues
- Whether exoneration of the employee in a departmental enquiry requires quashing of the criminal prosecution on the same allegation of demand and acceptance of a bribe.
- Whether State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi is per incuriam for not noticing Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., and which decision governs.
Held
- A later decision of a coequal Bench contrary to an earlier one on the same point is per incuriam, but Ajay Kumar Tyagi does not conflict with Radheshyam Kejriwal. The earlier case concerned adjudication and prosecution under FERA by the same entity, where the adjudication found on merits that the transaction itself had not occurred. The High Court erred in treating Ajay Kumar Tyagi as per incuriam. (¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 10, 13)
- The Radheshyam Kejriwal principle applies only where exoneration is on merits, holding the allegation wholly unsustainable; it cannot be extended to every case where a statute imposes both civil and criminal liability, and does not apply where the charge failed for lack of diligence in leading evidence. (¶¶ 7, 8)
- Disciplinary proceedings (decided by the employer on preponderance of probabilities) and criminal prosecution (requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt) are independent: they differ in nature, standard of proof and adjudicating entity, and each turns on its own evidence. Exoneration in departmental proceedings does not by itself lead to quashing of the prosecution, and Ajay Kumar Tyagi squarely applies where the trap and prosecution are by an anti-corruption agency and the enquiry is by the employer. (¶¶ 9, 12, 13, 19)
- An enquiry report is not conclusive; the disciplinary authority decides whether to agree or differ, and must issue a show-cause notice specifying the points of disagreement when it differs from a finding of exoneration. Appointing a retired judicial officer as enquiry officer gives the report no greater weight. (¶¶ 14, 15)
- Here the exoneration rested on non-examination of the trap Inspector and on the independent witnesses having stood outside the room; the enquiry officer wrongly demanded a higher standard of proof, and the evidence of the complainant and independent witnesses was sufficient on preponderance of probabilities. A criminal court can compel attendance of witnesses, and the Court would not end the prosecution by anticipating laxity on the prosecuting agency's part. (¶¶ 15, 16, 17, 18)
- Since the disciplinary authority accepted the enquiry report subject to the outcome of the criminal case, the departmental order is not reopened by these observations, but a conviction would carry the service consequences reserved in that order. (¶¶ 11, 19)
Result
Appeal allowed; the High Court's order quashing the criminal proceedings set aside and the prosecution permitted to continue; the disciplinary order is not to be reopened, but a conviction will attract the service consequences reserved in it.