Summary
The Supreme Court held that limitation for challenging an arbitral award began when the signed copy was delivered, not when an earlier draft was circulated or orally pronounced. The record showed signed delivery only on 19 May 2018, bringing the objections within the statutory period. A minority opinion is not an independently challengeable or enforceable award, though its reasoning may support a challenge. The Section 34 petition was restored for decision on merits.
Issues
- Whether limitation ran from circulation of the draft or delivery of the signed award.
- What legal status a dissenting arbitrator’s opinion had.
Provisions considered
- Sections 31(1), (2), (5) and 34(3), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Mandatory signed delivery triggered the statutory challenge period, including the limited sufficient-cause extension. (¶¶ 4(vii)-(xii), 4(xvi)-(xviii), 5-9)
- Section 29, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996The majority decision constituted the arbitral award; a dissenting view was an opinion rather than a separate enforceable award. (¶¶ 4(iv)-(v), 4(xx))
Held
- Signing authenticates the award and delivery of a signed copy to the party triggers limitation under Section 34(3). Mere circulation of the earlier draft did not meet that requirement here. (¶¶ 4(vii)-(xii), 4(xvi)-(xviii), 5-6)
- The majority award determines enforceable rights. A minority opinion cannot independently be challenged or enforced as an award, but its reasoning may be considered in adjudicating objections. (¶¶ 4(iv)-(v), 4(xx))
- The tribunal’s procedural orders established signed delivery on 19 May 2018. The objections were within the statutory period calculated from that date; the dismissal orders were set aside and the petition restored without deciding the award’s merits. (¶ 5-9)
Result
Appeal allowed; limitation dismissal set aside and Section 34 petition restored for adjudication on merits.