Summary
Applying the Wakf Act as it stood before the 2013 amendment, the Court distinguished a dispute over whether land was wakf property from an ordinary eviction claim concerning admitted wakf property. The Tribunal had jurisdiction over the former despite the defendant being non-Muslim, while the latter belonged before the civil court under the then statutory scheme. The Board’s appeal against Sham Singh succeeded; its appeal concerning Teja Singh failed.
Issues
- Whether the Tribunal or civil court had jurisdiction over each of the two suits under the pre-2013 statutory scheme.
- How the statutory protection and limitation rules applied to a person disputing the wakf character of listed property.
Provisions considered
- Sections 83 and 85, Wakf Act, 1995, before the 2013 amendmentTribunal jurisdiction and exclusion of civil jurisdiction depended on whether the Act required the particular dispute to be determined by the Tribunal; the later express addition concerning tenant eviction did not govern these suits. (¶¶ 22, 44–53)
- Sections 6(1), its Explanation and proviso, 6(5), and 7(1), Wakf Act, 1995, applicable historical textQuestions about listed property’s wakf character fell within Tribunal jurisdiction; the one-year restriction and finality were subject to the notice and reasonable-opportunity protection identified by the Court. (¶¶ 47–48, 60–69)
Held
- The suits preceded the 2013 amendment, so the earlier text governed. Section 83 did not by itself exclude civil courts from every dispute connected with wakf property. The jurisdictional question was whether the Act required the specific matter to be determined by the Tribunal. (¶ 44–53)
- In Sham Singh’s case the written statement expressly denied that the suit land was wakf property. That question was covered by Sections 6 and 7 and therefore belonged to the Tribunal, with the civil-court bar operating. The defendant’s non-Muslim status alone did not remove the dispute from its jurisdiction. (¶ 54–66)
- Under the Explanation discussed by the Court, a person interested in the property could contest its inclusion. The one-year restriction applied where notice and a reasonable opportunity to represent the case had been afforded in the relevant inquiry; inclusion was not final against persons denied that opportunity. (¶¶ 60–62, 67–69)
- Teja Singh’s case was a possession and injunction claim arising from the terminated lease, covered by the pre-amendment rule in Ramesh Gobindram. Returning the plaint and documents for presentation to the civil court was correct. (¶¶ 23–24, 70–71)
Result
Civil Appeal 92 of 2019 allowed and High Court’s jurisdictional order in Sham Singh’s case set aside. Civil Appeal 93 of 2019 concerning Teja Singh dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.