Summary
The Supreme Court restored the 1993 removal from service of a Rajasthan cooperative department officer, holding that the High Court's Single Judge and Division Bench exceeded their writ jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence of the departmental enquiry as an appellate court. The removal order rested on evidence and gave reasons, and the respondent had a fair hearing, so there was no violation of natural justice. Amounts already paid to the retired respondent were not to be recovered.
Issues
- Whether the High Court, under Article 226, could reappraise the evidence led in the departmental enquiry and hold the findings to be based on no evidence and perverse.
- Whether the removal order was unreasoned or passed in violation of natural justice because it did not discuss the respondent's representation in detail.
- Whether the punishment of removal was arbitrary or perverse.
Provisions considered
- Article 226, Constitution of IndiaRelying on S. Sree Rama Rao, Chitra Venkata Rao, S.K. Sharma, K.G. Soni, Man Mohan Nath Sinha and Bharti Airtel v. A.S. Raghavendra, the Court held that in reviewing a departmental enquiry the High Court does not sit in appeal: it may not reassess the adequacy or reliability of evidence, and may reappraise facts only where the infirmity is greater than ordinary. The courts below had wrongly re-appreciated the evidence. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29)
Held
- Under Article 226 the High Court is not an appellate court over a departmental enquiry: where there is some evidence reasonably supporting the finding of guilt, it cannot review the evidence and reach its own finding, and the disciplinary authorities are the sole judges of facts if the enquiry is properly held. Reappraisal of facts is not wholly barred, but the order under review must show more than ordinary infirmity. (¶¶ 23, 24, 27, 28, 29)
- The Division Bench, though it noticed these limits, endorsed the Single Judge's view that the enquiry rested on no evidence and was perverse without giving reasons of its own; both courts acted as courts of appeal and their judgments were unsustainable. (¶¶ 21, 22, 28, 33)
- Complaints of procedural lapses are tested for prejudice. After the earlier removal order was quashed, the respondent received the enquiry report and the RPSC's opinion, made a written representation and was heard, and he did not claim prejudice; there was no breach of natural justice. (¶¶ 25, 29)
- The removal order, based on the enquiry officer's findings after a large body of oral and documentary evidence, was not a case of no evidence; it gave reasons where the disciplinary authority disagreed with the enquiry officer and discussed the evidence where it agreed. A disciplinary authority accepting the enquiry findings need not give elaborate reasons (Boloram Bordoloi). (¶¶ 30, 31, 32)
- The charges were broadly proved on official documents that the respondent never denied or alleged to be false or fabricated, and his counsel could not controvert the facts about not handing over charge, appointing persons without permission and returning money after one and a half years. (¶¶ 33, 36)
- The fresh removal order closely resembled the earlier one and engaged with the representation only implicitly; though disciplinary authorities imposing a major penalty should engage better with the employee's representation, this minor deficiency caused no prejudice warranting interference. (¶¶ 34, 35)
- Given the respondent's conduct, the punishment of removal was neither arbitrary nor perverse. (¶ 36)
Result
Appeals disposed of; impugned Division Bench judgment set aside and the removal order dated 28/09/1993 restored with consequences in law; as an extraordinary indulgence, since the respondent is retired and aged, payments already made to him are not to be recovered; no costs.