Summary
In 2008, on a State Government direction following a settlement proposal, a Revenue Officer reviewed a 1971 order under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act that had vested a company's agricultural land in the State; the High Court upheld the review. The Supreme Court held that the review was without jurisdiction and void: a quasi-judicial authority has no review power unless the statute expressly confers it, and Section 57A's grant of civil court powers does not include review. The review also failed on the Order XLVII Rule 1 grounds, and the 1971 vesting order was restored.
Issues
- Whether a Revenue Officer under the WBEA Act, 1953, invested with all powers of a civil court under Section 57A, could review a concluded 1971 vesting order on a Government direction.
- Whether the company proved that it was engaged exclusively in farming on 01.01.1952 so as to retain land under Section 6(1)(j).
- Whether, even if a review power existed, any ground for review was made out.
- Whether the alleged amicable settlement, promissory estoppel, non-payment of compensation or continued possession assisted the company.
Provisions considered
- Section 57A, West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953Section 57A lets the State invest Section 53 authorities with civil court powers under the CPC; the omnibus 1958 notification doing so was held not to confer a power of review on Revenue Officers, which needs specific statutory conferment. (¶¶ 27, 28, 34, 35, 49, 93)
- Section 57B(3), proviso, West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953The proviso bars a Revenue Officer from reopening matters already determined under the Act, showing that the legislature did not intend a review power; the 1971 vesting order, made after full inquiry and having attained finality, could not be reopened. (¶¶ 50, 51, 52)
- Section 6(1)(j), West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953A company may retain agricultural land only if it was engaged exclusively in farming (and directly connected business) on 01.01.1952; the company failed to prove this in 1971 despite repeated opportunities, and its memorandum and later documents did not establish exclusive farming. (¶¶ 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73)
- Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Treated as stating the grounds on which any review lies; no new evidence undiscoverable with due diligence, no error apparent on the face of the record and no analogous sufficient reason was shown. (¶¶ 62, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81)
- Article 124 of the Schedule, Limitation Act, 1963Prescribes thirty days for a review application in civil courts; the unexplained delay of about four decades in reopening the 1971 order made the review impermissible. (¶ 83)
Held
- The power of review is not inherent; quasi-judicial authorities may review only where the statute confers that power specifically or by necessary implication, and a review without such power is ultra vires and void. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33, 34, 35)
- A blanket investiture of all civil court powers on executive functionaries exercising quasi-judicial powers, such as Revenue Officers, does not include review; reading it otherwise would let executive authorities sit in judgment over their own concluded decisions, contrary to the separation of powers and the principles governing tribunals. (¶¶ 47, 48, 49, 56, 57)
- The WBEA Act does not contemplate executive reopening of a vesting determination; under the Section 57B(3) proviso the Revenue Officer was barred from reopening the 1971 order, and a Government Order, even one approved at ministerial level, could not create that jurisdiction. (¶¶ 50, 51, 52, 58, 91, 93)
- The 1971 vesting order was valid: the company was given notice and several adjournments, failed to produce evidence of exclusive farming, and said it had nothing further to submit. A memorandum listing farming among many unrelated objects does not prove exclusive farming, and documents created later or withheld in 1971 cannot found a review. (¶¶ 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73)
- Even if review power existed, none of the Order XLVII Rule 1 grounds was met: old documents in the party's own custody are not a 'discovery', there was no self-evident error, and 'any other sufficient reason' means a reason analogous to the first two grounds. A review prompted by an amicable settlement and the economic benefits of a proposed project rests on considerations extraneous to review jurisdiction. (¶¶ 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82)
- Reopening a final vesting order after about forty years without sufficient cause was impermissible; non-distribution of the land, continued possession and non-payment of compensation confer no title once land has vested by operation of law, and non-payment of compensation gives only a statutory right to compensation. (¶¶ 83, 90)
- As there was no subsisting dispute on retention when the so-called settlement was reached, the Government Order lacked foundation; promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to sustain an order without jurisdiction; and an order passed without inherent jurisdiction is a nullity whose invalidity can be raised at any stage, so the Tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction in quashing it. (¶¶ 85, 86, 87, 88, 89)
Result
Appeal allowed; High Court judgment dated 17.05.2012 set aside; the Tribunal's order dated 31.03.2010 restored and the review order dated 07.05.2008 quashed; the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 to continue to operate in accordance with law.