Summary
Dismissal of the purchaser’s specific-performance suit was upheld. Only one co-owner had signed and his alleged authority from the others was not proved. The purchaser did not testify, while his subsequently appointed attorney lacked the necessary personal knowledge to establish readiness and willingness. His prolonged inaction despite knowledge of the later sale also weighed against relief under the law governing this transaction.
Issues
- Whether the agreement bound co-owners who neither signed nor were shown to have authorised its execution.
- Whether a subsequently appointed attorney could prove the purchaser’s personal readiness and willingness.
- Whether filing within limitation alone overcame prolonged inaction.
Provisions considered
- Order III, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908As explained in the precedents applied, authority to act does not authorise substitution for the principal’s testimony on matters exclusively within the principal’s knowledge. The attorney can testify to acts personally performed or known. (¶¶ 9, 10, 12)
- Section 12, Specific Relief Act, 1963The co-owner precedent applied did not permit use of partial-performance relief to compel non-party co-owners to part with their interests or submit to a forced partition. (¶¶ 6, 7)
Held
- The agreement did not state that its signatory acted as attorney for the other co-owners; instead it required him to secure their execution of the eventual deed. Their alleged power of attorney was neither produced nor proved, and they had not signed the agreement or extensions. Specific performance of the claimed entire property therefore failed. (¶¶ 5, 6, 7)
- An attorney may testify about acts performed and transactions personally handled, but cannot replace the principal on matters known only to the principal. The Court applied the distinction in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Man Kaur; the latter also recognises circumstances where an attorney managing the entire transaction or affairs has the requisite knowledge. The ruling is not a blanket prohibition on attorney evidence. (¶¶ 8, 9, 10, 12)
- Here the purchaser did not enter the witness box or submit to cross-examination. His attorney was appointed only shortly before giving evidence, rather than having conducted the transaction. An attorney without personal knowledge could not establish the purchaser’s state of mind, conduct, capacity and preparedness comprising readiness and willingness. (¶¶ 8, 10, 12, 13)
- Under the specific-performance principles applied to this transaction, compliance with the limitation period alone did not compel a decree. Contractual deadlines and the purchaser’s conduct remained material. Despite knowing of the subsequent sale, issuing notice and opposing mutation, he delayed suit until the end of limitation; this furnished an additional reason to refuse relief. (¶¶ 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18)
- The High Court’s dismissal of the suit was affirmed and the appeal dismissed, with parties bearing their own costs. (¶ 19)
Result
Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment refusing specific performance upheld. Parties to bear their own costs.