Summary
In an appeal confined to sentence for kidnapping and rape, the Court held that omission to specify concurrency or the sequence of imprisonment does not automatically make multiple sentences concurrent. Nevertheless, exercising Article 142 in the particular circumstances, it capped substantive imprisonment at fourteen years instead of the aggregate twenty-two years. Each appellant’s applicable fines and default imprisonment remained intact.
Issues
- Whether silence about concurrency and the sequence of sentences required concurrent imprisonment.
- Whether the single-transaction principle mandated concurrency.
- Whether the aggregate imprisonment warranted case-specific relief.
Provisions considered
- Section 31, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Explained judicial discretion, the duty to specify concurrency or consecutiveness and sequence, and the inapplicability of subsection (2) to a Sessions trial. (¶¶ 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 21)
- Section 220(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Distinguished the single-transaction rule governing joint trial from an automatic right to concurrent sentences. (¶¶ 14, 14.1)
- Article 142, Constitution of IndiaInvoked complete-justice powers to cap substantive imprisonment on these peculiar facts without announcing a general fourteen-year limit. (¶¶ 17.1, 19, 19.1)
Held
- Courts must exercise sentencing discretion judicially in light of the offences and surrounding circumstances. They must expressly state whether multiple prison terms run concurrently or consecutively and, for consecutive terms, their sequence. (¶¶ 10, 10.1, 10.2, 11, 12, 21)
- Absent a direction for concurrency, term sentences run consecutively. Failure to specify their sequence does not itself convert them into concurrent sentences. (¶¶ 12, 13)
- The same-transaction principle principally concerns joinder of charges and trial; it does not automatically require concurrent punishment. Sentences imposed on other facts do not fix the appropriate sentence here. (¶¶ 14, 14.1, 15)
- Section 31(2) did not directly limit the Sessions Court’s power. But the pre-2013 offences, over thirteen years already served and absence of adverse prison-conduct material justified an Article 142 cap of fourteen years in this case alone. (¶¶ 17, 17.1, 19)
- The second appellant, who had not appealed below, was not entitled to the first appellant’s reduced default terms. Fines and each appellant’s applicable default terms survived; default imprisonment was to run consecutively in the specified offence order. (¶¶ 18, 19.1)
Result
Appeal partly allowed: substantive imprisonment capped at fourteen years under Article 142; convictions, fines and applicable default sentences preserved. Default terms to run consecutively in the order of Sections 363, 366 and 376(1).