Summary
A state transport corporation driver found colour blind at a periodic medical examination was retired on medical grounds without being offered alternate employment. The Supreme Court held that Clause 14 of the 1979 Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which promises an alternate job with pay protection to colour-blind drivers, remains binding and was not superseded by the 1986 settlement or internal circulars; that the Corporation made no effort to assess redeployment; and that reasonable accommodation of employees who acquire a disability in service is a constitutional and statutory imperative under Articles 14 and 21 even outside the statutory definition of disability.
Issues
- Whether the appellant's retirement on medical grounds for colour blindness, without offering alternative employment, is sustainable under the applicable service regulations and binding settlements.
- Whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979 under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 remains valid and enforceable despite the subsequent settlement of 22.12.1986 and internal administrative circulars.
- Whether the Corporation discharged its duty to make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options for the appellant.
- Whether the High Court's reliance on A.P.S.R.T.C. v. B.S. Reddy was tenable when the appellant's rights arose independently under a binding industrial settlement.
- Whether an employee whose condition falls outside the statutory definition of disability is nonetheless entitled to reasonable accommodation before medical retirement.
Provisions considered
- Section 12(3), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947A settlement arrived at in conciliation proceedings under Section 12(3) is not an administrative circular but a binding statutory contract between labour and management, a quasi-statutory instrument that courts must give purposive effect to unless expressly rescinded or demonstrably superseded; Clause 14 of the 1979 settlement therefore governs colour-blind drivers. (¶¶ 14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23)
- Section 18(3), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947By virtue of Section 18(3) a settlement reached in conciliation binds not only the parties but all workmen of the establishment and their successors, which gave the 1979 settlement independent statutory force in favour of the appellant. (¶¶ 20, 28)
- Section 47 (read with Section 2(i)), Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995Section 47 bars an establishment from dispensing with or reducing in rank an employee who acquires a disability during service, requires a shift to another post on the same pay or retention on a supernumerary post, and bars denial of promotion on that ground. The Court treated it as a mandatory, beneficial provision (Kunal Singh) but held that the appellant's rights did not rest solely on it, so B.S. Reddy, which confined Section 47 to disabilities enumerated in Section 2(i), did not govern. (¶¶ 28, 30, 31, 32, 10.5)
- Articles 14 and 21, Constitution of IndiaReasonable accommodation is an aspect of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21; the failure to explore alternate employment before medical retirement is a substantive illegality violating the right to livelihood and equal treatment, and the duty to accommodate employees who acquire disabilities in service is part of the constitutional fabric. (¶¶ 17, 29, 37, 40)
- Regulation 6A(5)(b), A.P.S.R.T.C. Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964The regulation under which the appellant was retired only provides for the terminal benefits payable on medical retirement of a driver; a mechanical reading of it and reliance on internal circulars cannot override the obligation to redeploy under the binding settlement. (¶¶ 12, 14, 17)
Held
- Medical unfitness for a particular post does not automatically entail incapacity for public service; colour blindness disqualifies the appellant from driving but not from non-driving roles. Where an employee acquires a disability in service the employer must retain him by providing suitable alternate employment unless no such post exists (Kunal Singh). Retirement on medical grounds must be a last resort after all reasonable avenues of redeployment are exhausted. (¶¶ 13, 17)
- Clause 14 of the 1979 settlement, which provides an alternate job with protection of time scale and pay and continuity of seniority for drivers found colour blind, remains valid and enforceable: the 1986 settlement does not refer to it, contains no supersession or termination clause, and its Clause 5(d) on medically unfit drivers is general whereas Clause 14 is specific, so the earlier clause continues to govern on the principle generalia specialibus non derogant; a beneficial provision in a prior settlement is not overridden absent express revocation or contradiction. The Corporation's continued adherence to Clause 14 in other cases after 1986 confirms this. (¶¶ 16, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 21)
- Internal circulars of 2014 and 2015 purporting to deny alternate employment to colour-blind drivers and limit them to additional monetary benefit are administrative instructions that cannot override binding service conditions created by a statutory settlement under Section 12(3). (¶¶ 10.4, 23)
- Even under the 1986 settlement, the obligation to identify alternate jobs 'to the extent possible' presumes an active, documented effort; the burden lies on the Corporation, not the employee, to establish that no suitable post was available or could reasonably be created. Here there was no file noting, committee report, vacancy statement or suitability assessment, and the request for the post of Shramik went unanswered; the retirement order is void for non-consideration of the claim. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 27)
- The Division Bench erred in applying B.S. Reddy, which dealt only with the limited scope of Section 47 of the 1995 Act, because the appellant's rights flow from a contractual settlement carrying independent statutory force under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act; the correct line of precedent is Kunal Singh and Vikash Kumar, which require employers to retain employees with acquired impairments through accommodation and redeployment. (¶¶ 28, 29)
- Even where a condition such as colour blindness does not fall within the statutory definition of disability, the employer is bound to provide reasonable accommodation and cannot terminate employment without exploring alternate roles (Mohamed Ibrahim; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal); employees who acquire disabilities during service must not be prematurely retired without a fair opportunity for reassignment, as a constitutional and statutory imperative rooted in non-discrimination, dignity and equal treatment, and beneficial legislation must be construed purposively. (¶¶ 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41)
Result
Appeal allowed; High Court judgment in W.A. No. 1343 of 2017 set aside; the Corporation directed to appoint the appellant to a suitable post consistent with his condition, on the same pay grade he held on 06.01.2016, within eight weeks of receipt of the order; the appellant entitled to 25% of arrears of salary, allowances and benefits from termination to reinstatement, with the intervening period counted as continuous service; no order as to costs.