Summary
Purchasers who cancelled a flat booking by a deed executed before the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, but registered after it, were held entitled to the unamended two-year period for claiming refund of stamp duty, because their right accrued on execution and a shortened limitation cannot defeat an accrued right. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority also had no power to recall its order granting the refund. The refund was restored with interest.
Issues
- Whether the six-month limitation introduced by the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 governs a refund claim on a cancellation deed executed before the amendment but registered after it.
- Whether a technical delay should defeat a bona fide refund claim where the purchasers were not at fault.
- Whether the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority could review or recall its own order sanctioning the refund, and whether the purchasers' participation in the later proceedings conferred that power.
Provisions considered
- Section 48(1) and proviso (read with Section 47), Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958The proviso allowed an application for refund within two years of a registered cancellation deed of an agreement to sell; the 2015 amendment cut this to six months from registration. The Court held the unamended two-year period applied because the right to refund accrued when the cancellation deed was executed on 17.03.2015, before the amendment. (¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 14, 15, 16)
- Section 47, Registration Act, 1908The purchasers relied on the rule that a registered document operates from the time it would have operated had no registration been required; the Court accepted that the operative date was execution, not registration. (¶¶ 7, 8)
- Section 30(a), Limitation Act, 1963Cited within the passage quoted from M.P. Steel Corporation as an instance of the principle that a shortened limitation period does not extinguish an accrued right of action. (¶ 9)
Held
- The right to claim a refund of stamp duty arose when the cancellation deed was validly executed. Applying a shorter limitation period merely because registration took place after the amendment would retroactively defeat a vested cause of action; the High Court erred in treating the registration date as decisive. (¶¶ 8, 14)
- Following M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, although limitation is procedural and ordinarily retrospective, an amendment reducing the limitation period does not apply to a cause of action that had already accrued. (¶ 9)
- Even under the amended six-month period, a mere technical delay should not extinguish a valid refund claim where the purchasers cancelled in good faith because the developer could not give timely possession; relying on Bano Saiyed Parwaz and Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech, the State dealing with a citizen should not ordinarily rely on technicalities, and the expiry of limitation bars the remedy and not the right. (¶¶ 10, 11)
- A quasi-judicial authority has only the powers its statute confers. The Stamp Act gives the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority no power to review its own orders, so its later orders recalling the sanctioned refund were without jurisdiction. (¶¶ 12, 15)
- Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent, waiver or acquiescence; the purchasers' participation in the review proceedings did not confer review power, and the High Court erred in upholding the recall on that basis. (¶¶ 13, 14)
- As the State wrongly retained the stamp duty after the refund was first sanctioned, the purchasers were awarded simple interest at 6% a year from the date of that order. (¶ 18)
Result
Appeal allowed; the High Court's judgment set aside and the writ petition allowed. The CCRA's recall orders, including that of 16.12.2022, quashed and its order of 08.01.2018 granting refund restored. Refund of Rs. 27,34,500 with 6% simple interest from 08.01.2018 to be paid within four weeks, failing which interest at 12% a year; no costs.