Summary
The Supreme Court referred conflicting views on the duration of anticipatory bail to a larger Bench. It identified disagreement between decisions permitting protection to continue through trial and decisions requiring limited protection followed by regular bail. Its observations on the scope of Sibbia were expressly prima facie. The reference asks whether Section 438 protection must be time-limited and whether it ends when the accused is summoned; this order does not finally answer either question.
Issues
- Whether anticipatory-bail protection should be limited to a fixed period to enable surrender and an application for regular bail.
- Whether anticipatory bail should end when the accused is summoned by the court.
Provisions considered
- Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Conflicting interpretations of the duration of protection under this provision were referred for authoritative determination by a larger Bench, without a final answer in this order. (¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)
Held
- Different Benches of varying strength had expressed conflicting positions on whether anticipatory bail should continue through trial or last only for a limited period followed by recourse to regular bail. (¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- The view that Sibbia did not establish perpetual anticipatory-bail protection was stated only prima facie. Its quoted discussion, including the normal approach against time limits and the possibility of exceptional limits, required authoritative clarification in light of the conflicting decisions. (¶¶ 9, 10, 11)
- The two questions referred concern a fixed duration enabling surrender and regular bail, and termination of protection at the stage of summons. The Registry was directed to place the papers before the Chief Justice of India. (¶¶ 11, 12)
Result
Two questions concerning the duration and termination of anticipatory bail referred to a larger Bench. Registry directed to place the papers before the Chief Justice of India; no final determination of those questions in this order.