Summary
The appellant sought quashing of a chargesheet under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC founded on an FIR lodged in 2022 alleging that he had sexual relations with the complainant from 2006 under a false promise of marriage. The Court held that a consensual physical relationship between educated adults continued for about sixteen years, during which the complainant portrayed herself as his wife, cannot be attributed purely to a promise of marriage or treated as rape, found the allegations contradictory and belated, and quashed the FIR and all consequent proceedings as an abuse of process.
Issues
- Whether sexual relations maintained for about sixteen years between consenting adults can be prosecuted as rape on the allegation that consent was obtained by a false promise of marriage.
- Whether the FIR and chargesheet under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC disclosed a case fit to proceed or constituted an abuse of the process of law warranting quashing under Section 482 CrPC.
Provisions considered
- Section 376 read with Section 90 (consent under misconception of fact), Indian Penal Code, 1860Relying on Mahesh Damu Khare, Prashant, Deepak Gulati and Shivashankar, the Court held that criminal liability for sexual relations on a false promise of marriage arises only where the physical relationship is traceable directly to the false promise and the accused had no intention to marry from the inception; where a woman knowingly maintains the relationship for a prolonged period, consent cannot be said to be vitiated by misconception of fact. On the facts the relationship was consensual. (¶¶ 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37)
- Sections 384, 323, 504 and 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860These charges of extortion, hurt, insult and criminal intimidation accompanied the rape allegation in the chargesheet; the Court quashed the proceedings for all the offences alleged, holding that continuing the prosecution would be a gross abuse of process. (¶¶ 3, 12, 38, 39)
- Section 313, Indian Penal Code, 1860The allegation that the appellant spiked the complainant's drink and caused a miscarriage was treated as refuted because the Investigating Officer dropped Section 313 when filing the report under Section 173(2) CrPC. (¶¶ 11, 19)
- Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The High Court had dismissed the appellant's petition under Section 482 for quashing the criminal case. The Court, finding the allegations ex facie unbelievable and the prosecution an abuse of process, set aside that order and quashed the FIR and consequent proceedings. (¶¶ 3, 12, 38, 39)
- Sections 161, 164 and 173(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The complainant's statements under Sections 161 and 164 and the police report under Section 173(2) were examined; the Court noted that the Section 161 statement showed she knew of the appellant's relationship with another woman in 2020-2021 yet delayed lodging the FIR, and that the chargesheet was filed only against the appellant. (¶¶ 11, 12, 19, 32)
Held
- To make a man criminally liable for sexual relations allegedly obtained by a false promise of marriage, the physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise and must not be qualified by other circumstances or considerations. Where the woman knowingly maintains the physical relationship for a prolonged period, it cannot be said with certainty that the relationship was purely because of the promise, and consent cannot be said to have been vitiated by misconception of fact. Even assuming an initial false promise, continuation of the relationship over many years renders the plea of consent under misconception implausible. (¶¶ 26, 27, 28)
- There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex, and between a mere breach of promise and not fulfilling a false promise. An accused can be held liable only if the court concludes that his intention was mala fide and that from the very beginning he never intended to marry the complainant; a woman may agree to intercourse out of love and passion rather than solely on account of a misrepresentation, and an accused is not liable for rape if the complainant wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. (¶¶ 34, 35, 36)
- The complainant, a highly qualified adult, continued a consensual intimate relationship with the appellant for about sixteen years while they lived in different towns pursuing their jobs, mostly travelled to meet him, repeatedly portrayed herself as his wife, set up a case of a secret marriage ceremony, and complained only after learning that he was marrying another woman. The allegation of a first forcible act in 2006 in her own house while her parents were present, and of drink-spiking after three years of continuing relations, did not stand to reason. The allegations were full of material contradictions and ex facie unbelievable; this was a love affair or live-in relationship gone sour, not sexual exploitation on a false promise of marriage. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37)
- Allowing the prosecution of the appellant to continue for the offences under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC would be nothing short of a gross abuse of the process of law; the High Court's order refusing to quash was set aside and the FIR and all consequent proceedings were quashed. (¶¶ 38, 39)
Result
Appeal allowed. The High Court's order dated 24.04.2023 set aside; FIR No. 269 of 2022 (Police Station Bakewar, Etawah) and all proceedings consequent to it against the appellant quashed. Pending applications disposed of.