NAGARAJAN & ANR. versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU (14/05/2025) — Supreme Court headnote

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Summary

In appeals by persons convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for offences committed in 2001 and 1985, the Court held that Section 20AA of that Act, read with the repeal-and-savings clause in Section 97 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, excludes the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and Section 360 CrPC for offences committed between 1976 and the 2006 repeal, and that the lighter penalties of the 2006 Act cannot be applied to mollify the sentence where the repealing statute expressly saves penalties incurred under the repealed Act. The sentences of imprisonment were nonetheless converted to fines, in the lead appeal because of a discrepancy between the public analyst's and the Central Food Laboratory's reports, and in the connected appeal by following the coordinate Bench decision in A.K. Sarkar & Co. on grounds of judicial comity.

Issues

Whether the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (or Section 360 CrPC) can be granted to persons convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for offences committed after Section 20AA was inserted in 1976, notwithstanding the Act's repeal by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.
If not, whether the reduced penalties envisaged by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 can be imposed instead on the principle of beneficial construction of penal statutes.
Whether, notice having been limited to sentence, any relief could be granted on the conviction in the lead appeal in view of the discrepancy between the two analysis reports of the curd sample.
Whether the Court should follow the coordinate Bench decision in A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of W.B. despite its reservations about that decision's reasoning.

Provisions considered

Section 20AA, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954Inserted by the 1976 amendment, it provides that nothing in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or Section 360 CrPC applies to a person convicted under the Act unless under eighteen. Applying the literal rule, the Court held the provision too clear to admit any absurdity; it seals the question against the appellants and, read with Section 97 of the FSS Act, excludes probation for offences committed between 1976 and the repeal in 2006, consistent with Babu Ram v. State of Haryana. (¶¶ 13, 27, 30, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48)
Section 16(1), Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954Set out as the penalty clause under which the appellants were convicted: for adulterated food (clause (a)(i)) and for preventing a Food Inspector from taking a sample or exercising his powers (clauses (c) and (d)), imprisonment of not less than six months extending to three years and fine of not less than one thousand rupees. The minimum sentences imposed below were ultimately converted to fines. (¶¶ 4, 7, 19, 50)
Section 97 (proviso: repeal and savings), Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006The proviso saves the previous operation of the repealed Act, liabilities incurred, and any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred for offences against the repealed enactment, which may be imposed as if the FSS Act had not been passed. The Court held a repeal-and-savings clause is not surplusage; where it specifically protects a penalty under the old enactment, the legislative intent is clear and the Court cannot mollify the sentence by reference to the lighter penalties of the new Act. The coordinate Bench in A.K. Sarkar & Co. had not been taken through this clause. (¶¶ 14, 41, 43, 47, 48)
Article 20(1), Constitution of IndiaThe appellants founded their claim to a mollified sentence on Article 20(1) and the decisions in T. Barai and Rattan Lal, which hold that only retroactive penal legislation creating offences or enhancing punishment is prohibited and that an ex post facto law reducing punishment should be applied beneficially. The Court held T. Barai not wholly applicable: it concerned a Central and a State enactment on the same offence, dealt with punishment rather than probation, and involved no provision like Section 20AA or Section 97 and no repeal. (¶¶ 15, 28, 29, 35)
Sections 6 and 26, General Clauses Act, 1897Section 6 (effect of repeal, preserving liabilities, penalties and proceedings under a repealed enactment unless a different intention appears) and Section 26 (no double punishment where an act is an offence under two enactments) were set out as part of the legislative framework governing the effect of the 2006 repeal. (¶¶ 17, 18)
Act generally (release of offenders on probation), Probation of Offenders Act, 1958The Court surveyed the pre-1976 position (Ishar Das, Jai Narain, Pyarali K. Tejani, Prem Ballab) under which the Act applied to food adulteration offences though courts were cautioned against lightly resorting to it, and the object of the Act as described in Arvind Mohan Sinha. It held there is a fundamental difference between reduction of a sentence and release on probation, and that the Court must remain subservient to the legislature's express exclusion in Section 20AA. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 37, 40, 41)
Section 360, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The appellants argued that Section 20AA contradicts the reformative approach of Section 360 (release on probation of good conduct or after admonition). The Court held that Section 20AA expressly excludes both the Probation Act and Section 360 for persons convicted under the PoFA Act unless under eighteen, and that exclusion governs. (¶¶ 10, 13, 40, 41)
Article 15(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966Noted as containing a guarantee similar to Article 20(1) of the Constitution, including that an offender shall benefit from a subsequent law providing a lighter penalty; it did not alter the conclusion that the express savings clause governs. (¶ 16)

Held

The words of a statute are to be read in their natural and ordinary sense; beneficial construction or other interpretive rules are resorted to only if the literal rule fails or produces absurdity. Section 20AA of the PoFA Act is clear and admits of no absurdity. Nothing in the precedents extends the rule of beneficial construction to release on probation in the face of an express statutory exclusion. There is a fundamental difference between reduction or mollification of a sentence and releasing an offender on probation, and the Court cannot offend an express legislative provision merely to confer a benefit not envisaged by law. Section 20AA read with Section 97 of the FSS Act excludes the benefit of the Probation Act for offences committed between 1976 and the repeal in 2006, in line with Babu Ram v. State of Haryana. (¶¶ 39, 40, 41, 42, 48)
A repeal-and-savings clause is not mere surplusage. Where it specifically protects a penalty provided in the repealed enactment, the legislative intent is clear and the Court cannot, in its enthusiasm, grant the accused the lighter punishment of the new enactment. Mollification of sentence on the ground that the new law provides a lesser penalty is permissible only where no repeal-and-savings provision exists or where that clause itself envisages such a possibility, consistently with Basheer v. State of Kerala. (¶¶ 43, 48)
T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, though a leading authority on beneficial interpretation of penal statutes for sentencing, is not wholly applicable where the question is probation under a repealed Act with an express exclusion and savings clause: that case concerned a Central and a State enactment on the same offence, dealt with punishment rather than probation, and involved no provision like Section 20AA or Section 97 and no repeal. Paramjit Singh (offence pre-dating Section 20AA) and Santosh Kumar (commutation under Section 433(d) CrPC) are also inapplicable. (¶¶ 29, 33)
Although notice was limited to sentence, having regard to the age of the appellants and offences dating from 2001 and 1985 the Court examined the record. In the lead appeal the Food Inspector had mixed twelve curd samples and had not marked whether the milk was buffalo or cow milk; the public analyst found 4.6% fat against the 5% minimum for buffalo milk, whereas the Central Food Laboratory, Kolkata reported 8.3%. Such a discrepancy between the reports must be interpreted to the benefit of the accused, and following C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala the sentence of imprisonment was converted to fine. (¶¶ 44, 45, 46, 48)
In the connected appeal there was no reason to interfere with the conviction. The Court recorded its reservations about the coordinate Bench decision in A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of W.B., which converted imprisonment to fine on the strength of the lighter FSS Act penalty without having been taken through the repeal-and-savings clause and by relying on T. Barai. Rather than refer the question to a larger Bench, which would prolong litigation pending for forty years, the Court in the interest of justice, equity, propriety and judicial comity followed A.K. Sarkar and converted the sentence to fine. (¶¶ 47, 48)

Result

Both appeals partly allowed; convictions maintained; the six-month sentences of imprisonment converted to fines of Rs. 30,000 each for the appellants in the lead appeal and Rs. 20,000 for the appellant in the connected appeal, payable by the end of June 2025, failing which the order stands revoked and the appellants are liable to serve the six-month term less set-off for any period already in custody.