Summary
The Supreme Court restored the dismissal of an Airports Authority engineer found guilty of bribery in a departmental enquiry held after his criminal acquittal on benefit of doubt. In the intra-court appeal, the High Court Division Bench had wrongly reopened findings that were final from an earlier round of litigation, treated non-examination of the decoy as fatal, applied the criminal standard of proof, and re-appreciated evidence without finding the Single Judge's judgment perverse.
Issues
- Whether the Division Bench could depart from findings in an earlier round of litigation between the same parties (that a departmental enquiry was permissible despite the acquittal and that G.M. Tank did not apply) which had attained finality.
- Whether non-examination of the complainant or decoy is fatal to a departmental enquiry into bribery where the trap laying officer and other witnesses support the charge.
- What standard of proof applies in a disciplinary enquiry as against a criminal trial, and whether confessions inadmissible in a criminal trial may be considered.
- What are the limits of interference in an intra-court writ appeal with a Single Judge's findings of fact.
Provisions considered
- Sections 25 and 26, Indian Evidence Act, 1872These bars on proving confessions made to the police or in police custody against an accused were held not to apply in a domestic enquiry. Following Narender Singh, a confession of the delinquent recorded during the criminal investigation can be relied upon by the disciplinary authority. (¶¶ 26, 29)
- Article 226, Constitution of IndiaFollowing Sardar Bahadur, a High Court in writ jurisdiction does not sit in appeal over a disciplinary finding supported by relevant material or reassess the adequacy or reliability of evidence where the enquiry was properly held. In an intra-court appeal, a Single Judge's findings can be disturbed only for perversity or an error apparent in law. (¶¶ 34, 36, 37)
Held
- In an earlier round of litigation, a Division Bench held that a departmental enquiry could be held despite the acquittal, that the acquittal was on insufficient evidence and not honourable, that strict rules of evidence do not apply, and that G.M. Tank did not apply. Those findings became final between the parties when the Supreme Court dismissed the respondent's SLP. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment virtually overturned them, and on that ground alone its judgment could not stand. (¶¶ 26, 27)
- Non-examination of the decoy or complainant is not fatal. Even in a criminal bribery case a conviction may rest on the evidence of the trap laying officer and trap witnesses when the decoy turns hostile (Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave), and in a domestic enquiry, where strict rules of evidence do not apply, other evidence implicating the officer suffices. (¶¶ 28, 29)
- Here the trap laying officer, examined in the enquiry, fully supported the charge and was substantially corroborated by the Assistant Commissioner of Police and the Executive Engineer, so the Division Bench erred in holding the enquiry vitiated. (¶ 30)
- A disciplinary authority that accepts the enquiry officer's findings need not deal with every ground in the delinquent's representation or give detailed reasons (Boloram Bordoloi). It must examine the evidence and reach a reasoned conclusion on preponderance of probabilities, which both authorities had done after considering the representation. (¶¶ 31, 32, 33)
- The Division Bench wrongly applied the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a disciplinary enquiry the department need only prove its case on preponderance of probabilities (Sardar Bahadur). (¶ 34)
- In an intra-court writ appeal, the appellate bench may interfere with the Single Judge's judgment only if it is perverse or suffers from an error apparent in law, not merely because another view is possible (Narendra & Company). The Division Bench recorded no such finding and instead re-appreciated the evidence extensively, while the Single Judge's judgment was well reasoned. (¶¶ 35, 36, 37, 38, 39)
Result
Appeal allowed; Division Bench judgment dated 01.03.2012 set aside, restoring the Single Judge's order upholding the respondent's dismissal from service; no order as to costs.