DASHRATH versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (24/04/2025) — Supreme Court headnote

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Summary

Conviction of a public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 affirmed: sanction was not vitiated merely because the sanctioning authority approved a draft order; investigation by an Inspector of Police was valid under a Maharashtra Government Order of 19.04.1989 issued under the first proviso to Section 17, which has the force of law and is judicially noticeable; the demand was proved. Article 142 cannot be used to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum, and a prison-term waiver is available only in rare, extraordinary cases on unimpeachable evidence. Considering the 25-year-old incident and the appellant's advanced age, the sentence under Section 7 was altered from two years' rigorous imprisonment to one year's simple imprisonment.

Issues

Whether the sanction to prosecute was vitiated for having been granted mechanically by approving a draft order without changes.
Whether investigation by an Inspector of Police contravened Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and whether a Government Order authorising such investigation had to be proved in evidence.
Whether the demand of illegal gratification was proved, having regard to Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi).
Whether the evidence of a seizure witness related to the complainant should be discarded.
Whether the Supreme Court can, under Article 142 of the Constitution, reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum or waive the prison term, and whether the sentence should be altered on account of the appellant's age and the passage of time.

Provisions considered

Section 19, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Sanction is an administrative function based on the authority's subjective satisfaction, on application of mind, that a prima facie case exists, not satisfaction about the truth of the facts. Approving a draft order found to need no change, with minor corrections of form, is not absence of application of mind; the provision exists to protect honest public servants, and no failure of justice was shown. (¶¶ 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)
Section 17, first proviso, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988The Government of Maharashtra's Order dated 19.04.1989, issued under the first proviso, authorises all Inspectors of Police in the Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate offences under the Act. Being issued under statutory authority it has the force of statute and is law; investigation by an Inspector (PW-4) was therefore competent. (¶¶ 16, 17, 18)
Sections 56 and 57, Indian Evidence Act, 1872A fact judicially noticeable need not be proved, and courts must take judicial notice of all laws in force in India. The Government Order being law, it was not necessary to bring it on record as evidence; the Special Court rightly took judicial notice of it. (¶ 18)
Section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973An error, omission or irregularity in sanction does not affect the validity of the proceedings unless the court is satisfied that a failure of justice has resulted. Since no irregularity in the grant of sanction was found, the Court was not even required to invoke this provision. (¶¶ 13, 14)
Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The appellant's candid answers during his examination, explaining the circumstances appearing against him, were taken into account along with the prosecution evidence in holding that the demand was proved beyond doubt. (¶¶ 7, 19)
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988Conviction on both counts affirmed. Having regard to the date of the offence, the appellant's advanced age and the stress of prolonged proceedings, imprisonment for the minimum period was held sufficient: the sentence under Section 7 was altered from two years' rigorous imprisonment to one year's simple imprisonment, the sentence under Section 13(1)(d) left unaltered, both to run concurrently with the fines imposed. (¶¶ 2, 19, 21, 23, 32, 33)
Article 142, Constitution of IndiaWhere a statute prescribes a minimum sentence, Article 142 cannot be used to impose a lesser term, as that would amount to legislation by the Court. Only rarely, in extraordinary cases such as a convict too ill to understand or be taken to prison, may the Court in its plenary power grant a prison-term waiver, and only on unimpeachable evidence; this was not such a case and H.P. Venkatesh was not followed. (¶¶ 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31)

Held

Sanction to prosecute is an administrative function resting on the sanctioning authority's subjective satisfaction, after due application of mind, that a prima facie case exists; it does not require satisfaction about the truth of the facts. Where a draft order is placed before the authority and he finds nothing to add or delete, the sanction cannot be faulted merely because no words were changed. PW-3 made minor corrections of form without altering substance, so absence of application of mind was not proved and no failure of justice was shown; there was no irregularity, let alone illegality, in the sanction. (¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 14, 15)
The requirement of sanction, whether under Section 19 of the PC Act, Section 197 CrPC or Section 218 BNSS, serves a salutary object of protecting innocent public servants from unwarranted and mala fide prosecution; intolerance of corruption is no ground to deny protection to the honest (Manzoor Ali Khan). (¶ 12)
The Government of Maharashtra's Order dated 19.04.1989, issued under the first proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act authorising all Inspectors of Police in the Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate offences under the Act, is a statutory instrument having the force of statute and is law. Under Sections 56 and 57 of the Evidence Act courts take judicial notice of all laws in force, so the Order did not have to be brought on record as evidence; the Special Court rightly took judicial notice of it, and its vires were never questioned. Investigation by an Inspector (PW-4) was therefore competent. (¶¶ 16, 17, 18)
The demand was proved beyond doubt by the prosecution witnesses and by the appellant's own frank answers under Section 313 CrPC. His claim that the arrears were a little short of Rs. 500 was unsupported by any defence material, while the complainant deposed that the demand was bargained down from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 500 for handing over 7/12 extracts; acceptance of Rs. 500 was not justified. (¶ 19)
The evidence of a seizure witness need not be discarded merely because he was related to the complainant where his version in chief was not shaken in cross-examination; in any event the other evidence on record independently supported the conviction. (¶ 20)
Where a statute prescribes a minimum sentence, the power under Article 142 cannot be invoked to reduce the sentence below it on so-called mitigating factors; that would amount to legislation by the Court and would supplant the statutory mandate (Narendra Champaklal Trivedi, Mohd. Hashim, Vikram Das). The statutory minimum, unless challenged, cannot be reduced even under Article 142. Offences under the PC Act stand on a different footing; an appellate court may in exceptional cases alter a sentence for recorded reasons, but not below the prescribed minimum. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29)
Only rarely and in extraordinary cases may the Supreme Court, in exercise of its plenary power to temper justice with mercy, grant a convict a prison-term waiver, for instance where a convict on bail is too ill to understand why he must go to prison or too ill to be taken there, and then only on unimpeachable evidence. This was not such a case, so the Court declined to follow H.P. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka. (¶¶ 30, 31)
While affirming the conviction, the date of the incident, the appellant's advanced age and the mental anxiety of prolonged proceedings justified imposing imprisonment for the minimum period: the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 7 was altered to one year's simple imprisonment, the sentence under Section 13(1)(d) was left unaltered, both to run concurrently, in addition to the fines imposed by the Special Court. The appellant must surrender and pay the fine within six weeks, failing which the alteration stands recalled and he must serve the trial court's sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment. (¶¶ 33, 34)

Result

Appeal partly allowed. Conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 affirmed; sentence under Section 7 altered from two years' rigorous imprisonment to one year's simple imprisonment, sentence under Section 13(1)(d) unaltered, both concurrent, in addition to the fines imposed. Appellant to surrender and pay the fine within six weeks, failing which the alteration stands recalled and the trial court's sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment revives.