Summary
The Supreme Court directed fuller election disclosures covering candidates’ and their spouses’ and dependants’ income sources, relevant government/public-company contracts and specified statutory disqualification information. It also required a permanent mechanism to monitor disproportionate asset growth and publish its analysis. Non-disclosure of assets and income sources was held to constitute undue influence. The Court refused to compel parliamentary amendments or order selective investigation of the listed legislators at that stage.
Issues
- Whether voters’ right to information required income-source and further financial disclosures.
- Whether ongoing asset monitoring and public reporting should be required.
- Whether non-disclosure constituted a corrupt practice and whether parliamentary amendment or selective investigation could be compelled.
Provisions considered
- Rule 4A and Form 26, Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961Directed suitable amendment to require income-source disclosures and further relevant information; existing disclosure requirements were not exhaustive of voters’ informational rights. (¶¶ 26, 47, 49, 50, 54, 55, 65, 66, 67)
- Section 169(1), Representation of the People Act, 1951Rule-making authority after consultation with the Election Commission could implement the required disclosures to enforce voters’ constitutional rights. (¶¶ 40, 41, 46, 50, 51, 54, 55)
Held
- Information about candidates’ and their spouses’ and dependants’ income sources was relevant to informed electoral choice under Article 19(1)(a). Existing Form 26 requirements were indicative rather than exhaustive. Rule 4A and Form 26 were to be suitably amended to require these sources of income. (¶¶ 23, 24, 25, 26, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55)
- A permanent institutional mechanism was required to collect and examine legislators’ and their associates’ financial data periodically, identify disproportionate asset growth and recommend appropriate action, including prosecution or placement before the legislature. Data, analysis and recommendations were to be made public for informed voter choice. (¶¶ 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61)
- The Court declined, at that stage, selective investigation of the legislators named in the petition’s annexure, because scrutiny without a regular mechanism for the class as a whole could become political witch-hunting. (¶ 62)
- Applying the reasoning in Krishnamoorthy, non-disclosure of candidates’ and their spouses’ and dependants’ assets and income sources constituted undue influence, a corrupt practice under Section 123(2). The judgment declared that principle without itself voiding any named candidate’s election. (¶¶ 63, 64)
- Disclosure was also required of relevant government/public-company contracts held directly or through the specified entities in which the candidate, spouse or dependants had an interest. The six additional information requests concerning existing statutory disqualifications were allowed. (¶¶ 28, 65, 66, 67)
- The Court discussed competence to create further disqualification rules and monitoring arrangements, but did not itself impose a new automatic disqualification merely for asset growth. It refused mandamus compelling Parliament to amend the Act, leaving legislation to Parliament. (¶¶ 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 53)
Result
Writ petition allowed to the indicated extent without costs: expanded disclosures and permanent monitoring directed, non-disclosure declared undue influence, and the specified further information prayers granted; parliamentary-amendment and selective-investigation prayers declined.