Summary
Landowners challenged a 2005 final notification under Section 17 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973. They also challenged Section 20, which fixes the amount payable at 300 times the property tax rather than market value. A Single Judge struck down Section 20. The Division Bench upheld the invalidation, holding Article 31C unavailable to a pre-44th Amendment law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had decided the validity of a State law cryptically and casually. It had not examined the Act's scheme, whether the method was illusory, whether the Act served Article 39(b) and so had Article 31C protection. The judgments were set aside and the writ petitions remitted, with liberty to amend, and Section 20 restored to operation.
Issues
- Whether the High Court properly decided the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, which fixes the amount payable for acquired land at 300 times the property tax.
- Whether Article 31C protection was unavailable to the 1973 Act because it came into force before the 44th Amendment.
- How the challenges based on lapse and on the inapplicability of Section 17 should be dealt with.
Provisions considered
- Section 20, Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973Its validity must be examined against the Act's scheme and objects. The questions include whether 300 times the property tax is an objective method that is not illusory and whether the provision falls under Article 39(b). The question was remitted. (¶¶ 7, 14, 16, 21)
- Section 17, Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973The new plea that the land, never declared a slum or slum clearance area, could not be acquired under Section 17 was not pleaded. It may be raised by amendment on remand and could make the validity question unnecessary. (¶¶ 12, 19, 21)
- Articles 31C and 39(b), Constitution of IndiaArticle 31C, as validated in Kesavananda Bharati, was in force from 20.4.1972. A law enacted before the 44th Amendment is not for that reason denied its protection, but the reach of Article 39(b) to private property is pending before a larger Bench. (¶¶ 11, 14, 23)
Held
- A constitutional court declaring a State law ultra vires must examine the Act's scheme, objects and purposes. It must consider whether the prescribed method of determining the amount is permissible or per se unjust, and whether it is objective rather than illusory, bearing in mind the presumption of constitutionality. The High Court decided the question cryptically and casually. (¶¶ 14, 16)
- Even if the 1973 Act came into force before the 44th Amendment, that would make no difference, because Article 31C was in force from 20.4.1972 to the extent validated in Kesavananda Bharati. Whether the Act is referable to Article 39(b) bears on its immunity from challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31. (¶ 14)
- Because the pleadings on both sides were deficient and new pleas had been raised, the writ petitions were remitted to the Single Judge. Both sides were given liberty to amend or file better affidavits, including the plea that Section 17 did not apply, and the plea that the power was not exercised within a reasonable time was also left for the High Court. (¶¶ 17, 19, 20A, 21, 22)
- The Single Judge may await the larger Bench's decision in Property Owners' Association on whether 'material resources of the community' in Article 39(b) includes private property, if that question becomes necessary. (¶¶ 11, 23)
Result
Appeals disposed of. The Division Bench and Single Judge judgments were set aside and the writ petitions restored for fresh consideration, with liberty to amend. The declaration that Section 20 was ultra vires stood effaced and the provision was to operate until further orders. All contentions were left open.