Summary
The Supreme Court set aside an order directing prosecution of additional persons under Section 319 CrPC. Naming them during trial and placing them in the vehicle with the accused did not establish the required complicity. The mother’s account was hearsay, and the child’s evidence did not attribute the charged sexual acts or other sufficient criminal participation to the appellants. The High Court had neither applied the heightened evidentiary test nor supplied cogent reasons.
Issues
- What evidentiary satisfaction was required to summon additional accused under Section 319.
- Whether the trial testimony established sufficient complicity of these appellants.
Provisions considered
- Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973This extraordinary discretionary power requires strong and cogent trial evidence: more than the prima facie standard at charge-framing, though short of the specified conviction-level satisfaction. Mere naming or presence was insufficient here. (¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13)
Held
- A person omitted from the FIR and chargesheet may be proceeded against on trial evidence, but the power must be used sparingly and upon the heightened satisfaction stated in Hardeep Singh, rather than mechanically whenever a name appears. (¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9, 12)
- No act constituting the charged POCSO offences was attributed to these appellants. The mother’s hearsay account and the child’s statements about travel in a jeep and the appellants’ presence did not provide the necessary allegation and evidence of complicity on these facts. (¶¶ 10, 12)
- The High Court failed to record the necessary satisfaction or cogent reasons for reversing the trial court. Its order was set aside, leaving the trial court’s rejection of the Section 319 application operative. (¶¶ 11, 12, 13)
Result
Appeal allowed. High Court judgment set aside; trial court’s rejection of the application to proceed against these appellants under Section 319 restored.