Summary
The Supreme Court set aside a Kerala High Court order that had entertained, about ten years out of time, an appeal for enhancement of motor accident compensation filed by the deceased's children after they attained majority. The legal-disability exemption in Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to suits and applications for execution of a decree, not to appeals, and Section 5 did not assist where the children had been represented throughout the original claim by their father as natural guardian.
Issues
- Whether Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (legal disability) extends the time for filing an appeal by a claimant who was a minor when the original claim petition was instituted through a natural guardian.
- Whether a delay of about ten years in filing the appeal against the Tribunal's award could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on the facts.
Provisions considered
- Section 6, Limitation Act, 1963Quoted in full. Read as enabling a person under disability (minority, insanity, idiocy) to institute a suit or make an application for execution of a decree within the prescribed period after the disability ceases; it does not apply to an appeal or any other proceeding, and the legislature's intention being clear the courts cannot extend limitation on sympathy. (¶¶ 8, 9, 10, 12, 13)
- Section 7, Limitation Act, 1963Quoted in full. Noted as similarly worded to Section 7 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) construed by the Allahabad Full Bench in Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan: it refers only to suits and applications and makes no mention of appeals. (¶¶ 8, 11)
- Section 2(l), Limitation Act, 1963The definition clause provides that a 'suit' does not include an appeal or an application; hence suits, appeals and applications are treated differently under the Act and the exemption in Section 6 for suits cannot be stretched to appeals. (¶ 9)
- Section 3, Limitation Act, 1963Cited as further evidence that the Act deals with suits, appeals and applications as distinct categories. (¶ 9)
- Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963Permits admission of an appeal or application (other than an application under Order XXI CPC) after the prescribed period on sufficient cause; it does not apply to suits (Ajay Gupta v. Raju), and execution applications were excluded from condonation for the first time by the 1963 Act. On the facts Section 5 had no application given the long delay and the fact that the children were represented by their father in the original proceedings. (¶¶ 9, 10, 13)
- Section 166, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988The claim petition before the Tribunal was filed under this provision by the husband and two minor children of the deceased; the Kerala High Court in Musthafali v. Subair had treated proceedings under the corresponding Section 110A as in the nature of a suit. (¶¶ 4, 12)
Held
- Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enables a person disabled by minority, insanity or idiocy to institute a suit or make an application for execution of a decree within the limitation period after the disability ceases. Because Section 2(l) provides that a suit does not include an appeal or an application, and Sections 3 and 5 likewise treat suits, appeals and applications differently, the exemption applies only to suits and execution applications and not to appeals or other proceedings. (¶¶ 9, 10)
- Until the 1963 Act, execution applications were not excluded from the condonation provision (Section 5(b) of the 1871 Act and Section 5 of the 1908 Act); Section 5 of the 1963 Act excluded them for the first time and does not apply to suits. The disability provision of the 1877 Act, construed by the Allahabad Full Bench in Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan as confined to suits and applications and unavailable to minor defendants wishing to appeal, is similarly worded to the present Section 6. (¶¶ 10, 11)
- A claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is in the nature of a suit, so the disability exemption applies to the institution of the original proceeding or an execution application, not to an appeal, which is a continuation of the original proceeding. Where the original proceeding was instituted during the minors' minority by the father as natural guardian, who was alive and under no disability when the appeal period expired, no subsequent disability can be inferred; this observation is not to be read as making Section 6 applicable to appeals, which the legislature did not intend. (¶ 12)
- On the facts the father instituted the claim with both minor children as claimants, did not appeal the award, and did not file a cross-appeal for enhancement in the insurer's appeal (which was dismissed on the basis of an IRDA clarification that a package policy covers a pillion rider), taking a conscious decision to accept the award. The statements in the condonation application that the father had remarried and abandoned the children were unsubstantiated, and even if substantiated would not have enabled an appeal under Section 6; it is not for courts to extend limitation on misplaced sympathies, and Section 5 also had no application given the long delay. (¶ 13)
- The High Court's judgment was set aside, the appeal filed before it being grossly delayed and hence not maintainable. (¶ 14)
Result
Appeal allowed; the High Court's judgment enhancing the compensation to Rs 14,95,000 set aside, the claimants' MACA appeal being held grossly delayed and not maintainable.