DEVENDRA KUMAR versus THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. (20/08/2025) — Supreme Court headnote

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Summary

A court process server complained that the SHO of a police station abused him, made him stand with raised hands and sit on the floor for hours and detained him when he came to serve court processes. On the Administrative Civil Judge's written complaint under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, instead of taking cognizance, directed registration of an FIR under Sections 186 and 341 IPC under Section 156(3) CrPC, which the Sessions Court and High Court upheld. The Supreme Court held that 'obstruction' in Section 186 IPC is not confined to physical obstruction or criminal force, disapproved the resort to police investigation on a judge's complaint, and clarified that the Section 195 CrPC bar operates only at cognizance, not against an FIR or investigation; the petition was disposed of leaving the Section 195 objection open at the chargesheet stage.

Issues

Whether 'obstruction' under Section 186 IPC requires use of criminal force or violence, or whether any act impeding a public servant in the discharge of his lawful duties suffices.
Whether a Magistrate, on a written complaint by a public servant under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC for an offence under Section 186 IPC, could direct police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC instead of taking cognizance and issuing process.
Whether the bar of Section 195 CrPC prohibits registration of an FIR and police investigation, or operates only at the stage of taking cognizance.
When distinct offences disclosed by the same facts can be split from an offence covered by Section 195 CrPC.

Provisions considered

Section 186, Penal Code, 1860Quoting the section and comparing it with Section 133 of the Customs Act, 1962 ('intentionally obstructs'), construed in Collector of Customs v. Paradip Port Trust, the Court held that 'voluntarily' and 'intentionally' connote the same meaning and that 'obstruction' is not confined to physical obstruction or use of criminal force; any act causing impediment by unlawfully preventing a public servant from discharging his functions suffices. The allegations against the SHO prima facie amounted to obstruction, so the complaint suffered from no legal infirmity, though their truth is for the trial court. (¶¶ 8, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31)
Section 195(1)(a)(i), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Quoting Section 195, the Court held that no court can take cognizance of an offence under Sections 172 to 188 IPC except on the written complaint of the public servant concerned or his administrative superior; the provision is mandatory and cognizance without such a complaint renders the trial void ab initio. The complaint by the Administrative Civil Judge, to whom the process server was administratively subordinate, complied with it. The bar operates at the stage of cognizance and not against registration of an FIR or police investigation. The offence under Section 341 IPC, being closely interconnected with the Section 186 offence and incapable of being split, would also attract the bar. (¶¶ 9, 12, 16, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 58, 59)
Section 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The CMM, on receiving the Civil Judge's complaint, ordered registration of an FIR and police investigation under Section 156(3). The Court called this a very serious error: the Magistrate should have taken cognizance and issued process under Section 204, the dignity of the court being at stake and no offence under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) requiring police assistance being involved. Nevertheless there is no contradiction between invoking Section 156(3), registering an FIR and investigating, and Section 195 read with Section 340, since the bar applies only at cognizance. (¶¶ 9, 12, 14, 17, 18, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58)
Section 2(d) (Explanation), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Quoting the definition of 'complaint', the Court noted that a police report disclosing a non-cognizable offence (Sections 186 and 341 IPC here) is deemed a complaint with the police officer as complainant; but that legal fiction does not dispel the Section 195 embargo for Section 186, because it deems the police officer, not the aggrieved public servant, to be the complainant. (¶¶ 15, 16)
Sections 190 and 204, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Section 195 is an exception to the general rule in Section 190 that any person may set the law in motion by a complaint. On a complaint lodged by a public servant, verification on oath is not required; the Magistrate ought to have taken cognizance and issued process under Section 204, which would have allowed the trial to conclude within about three months instead of the matter pending for twelve years. (¶¶ 12, 14, 17, 35, 43, 50)
Section 340, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The procedure under Section 340(1) is limited to offences in Section 195(1)(b); it does not apply to an offence under Section 195(1)(a) such as Section 186 IPC, so no preliminary inquiry under Section 340 was required before the Civil Judge's complaint. Sections 195(1)(b) and 340 do not control the police power to investigate; after investigation the court concerned may file a complaint on the basis of the FIR and material collected by following the Section 340 procedure. (¶¶ 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59)
Section 341, Penal Code, 1860The FIR was also directed for wrongful restraint. The Court observed that where the FIR shows the Section 186 offence to be closely interconnected with another distinct offence, here Section 341, and the two cannot be split up, the bar of Section 195 applies to that other offence as well. (¶¶ 1, 4, 15, 36)

Held

The expression 'obstruction' in Section 186 IPC is not confined to physical obstruction and need not involve use of criminal force or violence; it is enough that the act complained of results in preventing a public servant from discharging his lawful duties. 'Voluntarily' in Section 186 and 'intentionally' in Section 133 of the Customs Act, 1962 connote the same meaning, and the construction of 'obstruction' in Collector of Customs v. Paradip Port Trust (anything that makes it more difficult for the public servant to carry out his duties) concludes the issue. Any other interpretation would encourage people to take the law into their own hands and thwart public justice. (¶¶ 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29)
A person who obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions commits two offences: the obstruction under Section 186 IPC and the offence of undermining the authority of the court, amounting to contempt of court. (¶¶ 13, 22)
On a written complaint by a public servant under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC for offences under Sections 186 and 341 IPC, the Magistrate should straightaway take cognizance and issue process under Section 204; directing police investigation under Section 156(3) was a very serious error, there being no offence under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) requiring police assistance, and a complaint by a civil judge carrying sanctity and needing no verification on oath. The Court did not approve the order of police investigation. (¶¶ 12, 14, 17, 18)
Even if a police report in a non-cognizable case is deemed a complaint under the Explanation to Section 2(d) CrPC, the embargo of Section 195 as regards Section 186 IPC is not dispelled, because the fiction deems the police officer and not the aggrieved public servant to be the complainant. (¶¶ 15, 16)
Section 195 CrPC is mandatory: no court can take cognizance of an offence under Sections 172 to 188 IPC without a written complaint of the public servant concerned or his administrative superior; cognizance assumed without such a complaint renders the trial and conviction void ab initio and vitiates all consequential orders. The provision is an exception to Section 190 and, curbing the general jurisdiction of the court, must be strictly construed. (¶¶ 35, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51)
Section 195 does not bar trial for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts, but if in truth and substance the offence falls within Section 195 the court cannot split it up and proceed for other distinct offences; whether splitting is permissible depends on the facts, the nature of the allegations and the material on record. Courts must apply twin tests: whether the other offences have been invoked only to evade the mandatory bar, and whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence requiring a complaint of the court or public servant. Offences that form an integral part of the same transaction fall within the bar; offences against private individuals arising from separate, successive transactions may be prosecuted independently. (¶¶ 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 59)
The bar in Section 195 CrPC operates only at the stage of taking cognizance; its opening words 'No Court shall take cognizance' create no bar against registration of a criminal case, investigation by the police or submission of a report under Section 173. The observations in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh and M. Narayandas that Section 195 has no application at the investigation stage hold good for both Section 195(1)(a) and Section 195(1)(b). Once investigation is complete the embargo comes into play and the court cannot take cognizance on the police report, but it may itself file a complaint on the basis of the FIR and the material collected, following the Section 340 procedure where that applies. (¶¶ 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59)
The procedure under Section 340(1) CrPC is confined to offences in Section 195(1)(b); no preliminary inquiry under Section 340 was required before the public servant's complaint for an offence under Section 186 IPC, which falls in Section 195(1)(a). (¶¶ 53, 58)

Result

Special leave petition disposed of without interfering with the High Court's order; liberty to the petitioner to raise the objection based on Section 195 CrPC before the trial court if a chargesheet is filed at the end of the investigation; Registry directed to circulate the judgment to all High Courts.