Summary
The Supreme Court held that a plea of juvenility which the courts never properly determined had not attained finality, and could be decided under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 even after the dismissal of the appeal, review and curative petitions and commutation of the death sentence by the President. As the State had admitted that the appellant was 14 at the time of the 1994 offence, the Court maintained the conviction, set aside the sentence beyond the statutory upper limit, and ordered his release.
Issues
- Whether a plea of juvenility, raised at every stage but never determined in accordance with law, can be raised and decided under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 after the case has been finally disposed of, including after dismissal of review and curative petitions.
- Whether the High Court, while declining judicial review of the Presidential order commuting the death sentence, could refuse the independent prayer for determination of juvenility under Section 9(2).
- Whether the appellant was a juvenile on the date of the offence, and the consequences for his sentence.
Provisions considered
- Section 9(2) and proviso, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015Treated as the heart of the Act: the court must inquire into and determine a claim of juvenility, which may be raised before any court at any stage, even after final disposal of the case and even if the person ceased to be a child before the Act commenced; a plea not determined under this procedure has not attained finality. (¶¶ 20, 21, 22, 32, 50, 51)
- Section 2(23), Sections 5 and 6, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015Every court competent to decide juvenility, including appellate, revisional and constitutional courts, must act as a juvenile court; Sections 5 and 6 confirm that a person who attains majority during the process is still to be treated as a child. (¶¶ 18, 19)
- Section 94(2), Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015Read as a reiteration of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, setting out the order of documents for age determination, with medical tests only in their absence. (¶ 26)
- Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7A and 20 (Explanation), Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000Section 7A and the Explanation to Section 20, inserted in 2006, made the Act applicable to juveniles who had ceased to be so before its commencement and allowed the claim to be raised at any stage, even after final disposal, giving the Act retrospective operation. (¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 17)
- Rule 12(3), Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007A rule of evidence prescribing a hierarchy of documents (matriculation certificate, school birth certificate, local authority birth certificate, and only then medical opinion); to be applied retrospectively where no earlier age inquiry was held, but it does not permit a fresh inquiry where due inquiry was held under earlier laws. (¶¶ 24, 25, 46)
- Sections 2(h) and 32, Juvenile Justice Act, 1986Section 32 obliged the competent authority to inquire into the age of a person appearing to be a juvenile; even this procedural mandate was not followed by the trial court and High Court. (¶¶ 12, 13, 47)
- Articles 72 and 161, Constitution of IndiaThe pardon power is a sovereign executive power, not appellate or revisional, subject to limited judicial review; refusal to review a clemency order does not displace the court's independent duty under Section 9(2), and granting relief under the 2015 Act is not a review of the Presidential order. (¶¶ 29, 30, 31, 32, 50, 51)
- Articles 14, 15(3), 39(e) and (f), 45 and 47, Constitution of IndiaIdentified as the constitutional foundation of juvenile justice, requiring courts to act as parens patriae and treat a child in conflict with law through reformation, rehabilitation and reintegration. (¶¶ 9, 10, 11, 14, 23)
- Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973The particulars given by the appellant at the start of his statement could not be relied on to deny juvenility; in any event the age he gave showed he was about 14 at the time of the offence. (¶¶ 33, 46)
Held
- The court's primary duty is to discover the truth; where procedural law obstructs the truth the court must find a way around it, and substantive law, particularly social welfare legislation, must be interpreted in light of its purpose. In juvenile matters the court acts as parens patriae. (¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 10, 11)
- Under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act, a plea of juvenility may be raised before any court at any stage, even after final disposal of the case; it must be recognised and duly determined on the material on record and cannot be brushed aside casually. Every court competent to decide the issue, including constitutional courts, assumes the role of a juvenile court. (¶¶ 19, 20, 21)
- A plea of juvenility that was raised but not adjudicated, or not treated and decided under the procedure in Section 9(2), does not attain finality. Dismissal of an SLP or statutory appeal, review petition or curative petition without conscious consideration of the plea does not bar a competent court from deciding it by due procedure; where the plea has been duly determined there may be no room for another round. (¶¶ 22, 23)
- Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules lays down a strict hierarchy of documents for age determination, a later document being considered only if the earlier ones are unavailable, and medical opinion only if none is available; it applies retrospectively where no earlier inquiry was held. Section 94(2) of the 2015 Act reiterates it. (¶¶ 24, 25, 26)
- A clear, unambiguous and unequivocal admission is the best evidence and the court must act on it; relief following from it cannot be denied on procedural grounds. No party should suffer for a patent mistake of the court (actus curiae neminem gravabit). (¶¶ 27, 28)
- Judicial review of clemency orders under Articles 72 and 161 is limited, but when a challenge to such an order is joined with an independent prayer under Section 9(2), the two are distinct, and refusal of the former does not extinguish the court's mandatory duty on the latter. The High Court erred in treating the matter as concluded, since the executive had not adjudicated the appellant's age. (¶¶ 31, 32, 50)
- On the State's repeated written admission of the school certificate, there was no dispute that the appellant was 14 at the time of the offence. The courts had wrongly relied on his Section 313 particulars and on a bank account, which has no relevance under the juvenile justice law, and had failed to follow even the procedure then in force. (¶¶ 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49)
- Setting aside the sentence in excess of the upper limit prescribed by the juvenile justice law while maintaining the conviction is not interference with the Presidential order but the grant of the benefit of the 2015 Act to a person entitled to it. (¶ 51)
Result
Appeal allowed; the High Court's judgment set aside; the conviction maintained but the sentence in excess of the upper limit prescribed under the relevant Act set aside and the appellant directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case; the Uttarakhand State Legal Services Authority directed to identify and help him avail welfare schemes for rehabilitation and reintegration, with emphasis on livelihood, shelter and sustenance.