Summary
The Supreme Court restored dismissal of the husband’s divorce petition and the wife’s decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The High Court wrongly treated his acquittal in a later criminal case as a substantial question of law establishing cruelty, although that allegation was not the pleaded and tried basis of divorce. Acquittal does not automatically justify dissolution. The Court also declined to dissolve the marriage under Article 142 on the particular facts.
Issues
- Whether a second appeal could grant divorce on the basis of a later criminal acquittal outside the pleaded and tried cruelty claim.
- Whether prolonged separation justified dissolution in these circumstances.
Held
- The trial and first appellate courts had assessed the pleaded allegations and concurrently found them unproved. The High Court’s questions effectively permitted factual reconsideration rather than identifying a genuine substantial question of law within Section 100. (¶¶ 7, 8, 12, 13, 14)
- The criminal complaint and subsequent acquittal were not the basis of the husband’s divorce petition or an issue tried with evidence. The High Court could not use that development alone to substitute a new ground for divorce; acquittal is not automatically proof of matrimonial cruelty. (¶¶ 14, 15)
- Unfounded allegations exposing a spouse and family to criminal litigation can support a cruelty claim in an appropriate case where that ground is properly raised and proved. That principle did not cure the defect in this case. (¶ 15)
- Article 142 dissolution requires consideration of the particular circumstances, rather than a fixed formula based on separation or litigation duration. Considering the nature of the differences, the child’s interests and the concurrent restitution proceedings, the Court declined that relief here. (¶ 16)
Result
Wife’s appeals allowed; High Court judgment set aside and trial judgments dismissing the divorce petition and granting restitution of conjugal rights, as affirmed on first appeal, restored. No costs; pending applications disposed of.